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Abstract 
This paper presents series on top shares of income and wealth in Spain over 
the 20th century using personal income and wealth tax return statistics. Top 
income shares are highest in the 1930s, fall sharply during the first two 
decades of the Franco dictatorship, and have increased slightly since the 
1960s, and especially since the mid-1990s. The top 0.01% income share in 
Spain estimated from income tax data is comparable to estimates for the 
United States and France over the period 1933-1971. Those findings, along 
with a careful analysis of all published tax statistics, suggest that income tax 
evasion and avoidance among top income earners in Spain before 1980 was 
much less prevalent than previously thought. Wealth concentration has been 
about stable from 1982 to 2004 as surging real estate prices have benefited 
the middle class and compensated for a slight increase in financial wealth 
concentration in the 1990s. We use our wealth series and a simple conceptual 
model to analyse the effects of the wealth tax exemption of stocks for owners-
managers introduced in 1994. We show that the reform induced substantial 
shifting from the taxable to tax exempt status. This shifting has eroded the 
wealth tax base substantially and hence the tax exemption has generated 
large efficiency costs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The evolution of income and wealth inequality during the process of 
development has attracted enormous attention in the economics literature. A 
number of recent studies have constructed series for shares of income 
accruing to upper income groups for various countries using income tax 
statistics. Most of those studies are gathered in a volume edited by Atkinson 
and Piketty, 2007. The countries studied are Anglo-Saxon countries (United 
Kingdom, Ireland, United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia) and 
continental European countries (Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland) and large Asian countries (China, India, Indonesia, 
and Japan). No such study has analyzed Southern European countries. This 
paper proposes to start filling this gap by analyzing the Spanish experience. 
Spain is an interesting country to analyze on several grounds. 
First, there are very few studies on the evolution of inequality in Spain 
from a historical perspective. A number of studies have analyzed the evolution 
of income, earnings and expenditure inequality over the last three decades 
using survey data. Research has also been done using income tax data for 
recent years.1 Survey-based studies point to a reduction in income or 
expenditure inequality in the 1970s followed by relative stability in the 1980s 
and 1990s, while tax-based results display a worsening in the distribution of 
income in 1982-1991 and 1995-1998. Garde, Ruiz-Huerta, and Martínez, 
1995, provide a survey of the literature until 1995.2 More recently, Prados de 
la Escosura, 2006a, 2007b has constructed long historical series on income 
inequality such as ratios of GDP per capita to low skill wages or average 
wages, as well as industry wage differentials. Those estimates are not based 
                                                
1 Those studies, which include Castañer, 1991, Lasheras et al., 1993, Ayala and Onrubia, 
2001, and Rodríguez and Salas, 2006, focus primarily on the redistributive power of the 
income tax. They estimate global inequality indices such as Gini before and after taxes and 
do not specifically focus on top income groups as we do here.  
2 For key studies on income inequality in Spain over the last decades, see Alcaide, 1967, 
1974, 1999, Alcaide and Alcaide, 1974, 1977, 1983, Alvarez et al., 1996, Ayala and Onrubia, 
2001, Ayala and Sastre, 2005, Ayala et al., 1993, Bosch et al., 1989, Budría and Díaz-
Giménez, 2007, Cordero et al., 1988, Del Río and Ruiz-Castillo, 2001a,b, Escribano, 1990, 
Febrer and Mora, 2005, Goerlich and Mas, 2001, 2004, Gradín, 2000, 2002, Martín-Guzmán 
et al., 1996, Oliver I Alonso et al. 2001, Pascual and Sarabia, 2004, Ruiz-Castillo, 1987, 
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on micro-data but offer the best evidence to date on inequality trends in Spain 
from a historical perspective. Therefore, our study can be seen as the first 
serious attempt at compiling systematic and long run series of income 
concentration using primarily individual tax statistics, a source that has not 
been fully exploited by previous studies. It is also important to note that our 
series measure only top income (or wealth) concentration and hence are 
silent about changes in the lower and middle part of the distribution. As a 
result, our series can very well follow different patterns than broader 
measures of inequality such as Gini coefficients or macro-based estimates, an 
important point we will emphasize throughout. 
Second, up to the 1950s, Spain was still largely an agricultural 
economy with a GDP per capita around $4,000 (in today dollars) similar to 
developing countries such as Pakistan or Egypt today.3 Indeed, because of 
the civil war shock and the poor economic performance during the first two 
decades of the Franco dictatorship, Spain GDP per capita did not reach the 
peak of 1929 before 1951. Starting in the 1950s and following economic 
liberalization and openness to trade, economic growth resumed at a very 
quick pace. Today, Spain’s GDP per capita is only about 20% lower than GDP 
per capita of the largest western European economies such as France, 
Germany, or the United Kingdom. Therefore, it is quite interesting to analyze 
income concentration during the stagnation years and during the economic 
boom starting in the late 1950s to re-assess the link between economic 
development and income concentration.  
Third, Spain has undergone dramatic political changes since the 
1930s. Spain was a republic from 1931 to 1939. A progressive government 
first ran the republic from 1931 to 1933, followed by a conservative 
government from 1933 to 1935, when some reforms of the previous years 
were abandoned. The reformist parties returned to power in 1935; however, 
the division between the advocates of the democratic changes and those 
                                                                                                                                      
1998, Ruiz-Castillo and Sastre, 1999. A summary of the key findings can be found in the 
appendix. 
3 Prados de la Escosura, 2003, 2006b, 2007a has constructed historical GDP and growth 
series for Spain. He emphasizes that, before the economic stagnation of the 1930-1952 
period, Spain experienced significant economic growth since 1850, in particular from 1850-
1883 and in the 1920s. Maddison, 2001, 2003 also reproduces those historical series of real 
GDP per capita in Spain in his international compilation. 
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supporting a revolutionary process became evident soon. A military coup lead 
by General Franco, followed by a three year long civil war, transformed Spain 
into a dictatorship from 1939 till the death of Franco in 1975. Since then, 
Spain has returned to democracy and was run from 1982 to 1996 by the 
Socialist party, which tried to implement progressive policies such as the 
development of progressive income and wealth taxation, and of a welfare 
state with universal health coverage. The study of top income and wealth 
shares in Spain can cast light on the effects of the political regime and 
economic policies on inequality and concentration. 
Finally, over the last twenty years, Spain has implemented large 
income and wealth tax reforms among which sharp reductions in top income 
marginal tax rates. Spain has also modified the wealth tax base by exempting 
corporate stocks and business assets for corporate and business owners 
actively involved in managing the business in 1994. Our constructed top 
income and wealth shares can be used to cast light on the effects of taxation 
on the economic and tax avoiding behavior of the affluent. We propose a 
detailed application in the case of the 1994 wealth tax exemption.   
Our results show that income concentration was much higher during 
the 1930s than it is today. The top 0.01% income share estimated from 
reported incomes was about twice higher in the 1930s than over the last two 
decades. The top 0.01% income share fell sharply during the first two 
decades of the Franco dictatorship, and has increased slightly since the 
1970s, and especially since the mid-1990s. Interestingly, both the level and 
the time pattern of the top 0.01% income share in Spain is fairly close to 
comparable estimates for the United States (Piketty and Saez, 2003) and 
France (Piketty, 2001, 2003) over the period 1933-1971, especially the post-
World War II decades. Those findings, along with a careful analysis of all 
published tax statistics as well as a re-evaluation of previous academic work 
on income tax evasion in Spain, leads us to conclude that income tax evasion 
and avoidance in Spain before 1980 was much less prevalent than previously 
thought at the top of the distribution. As a result, those income tax statistics 
are a valuable primary data source for analysing income concentration. 
Over the last two decades, top income shares have increased 
significantly due to an increase in top salaries and a surge in realized capital 
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gains. The gains, however, have been concentrated in the top percentile (and 
especially the top fractiles within the top percentile) with little changes in 
income shares of upper income groups below the top percentile. Financial 
wealth concentration has also increased in the 1990s due to a surge in stock 
prices, which are held disproportionately by the wealthy. However, real estate 
prices have increased sharply as well. As real estate wealth is less 
concentrated than financial wealth, on net, top wealth shares (including both 
financial and real estate wealth) have declined slightly during the period 1982-
2002.  
The data show that the wealth tax exemption of stocks for owner-
managers since 1994 has gradually and substantially eroded the wealth tax 
base, especially at the very top: by 2002, the top 0.01% wealth holders could 
exempt about 40% of their wealth because of this exemption. We develop a 
simple conceptual model to explain this phenomenon, which we estimate 
using our wealth series. Our empirical results show evidence of very strong 
shifting effects whereby wealthy business owners were able to re-organize 
their business ownership and activities in order to take advantage of the 
reform. This suggests that this tax exemption both reduced the redistributive 
power of the progressive wealth tax and created substantial deadweight 
burden as business owners were taking costly steps to qualify for the 
exemption. The case study of the wealth tax exemption illustrates how our 
series can be used to cast light on the evaluation of tax policy reforms. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data 
sources, outlines our estimation methods, and discusses the issue of income 
tax evasion in Spain. In Section 3, we present and analyze the trends in top 
income shares since 1933 as well as the composition of top incomes since 
1981. Section 4 focuses on top wealth shares and composition since 1982. 
Section 5 uses the wealth series to analyze the efficiency costs of the wealth 
tax exemption of 1994. Finally, Section 6 offers a brief conclusion. The 
complete details on our data and methods, as well as the complete sets of 
results are presented in appendix.4  
 
                                                
4 The appendix is available online at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/ 
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2. Data, Methodological Issues, and Context 
 
2.1. Data and Series Construction 
 
Our estimates are from personal income and wealth tax return statistics 
compiled by the Spanish fiscal administration for a number of years from 1933 
to 1971 and annually from 1981 on. The statistical data presented are much 
more detailed for the 1981-2004 period than for the older period. Because the 
received wisdom is that the individual income tax was poorly enforced, 
especially in the pre-1981 period, we will discuss in great detail this issue in 
Section 2.2 and throughout the text in Section 3. Complete details on the 
methodology are provided in appendix. 
Before 1981, because of very high exemption levels, only a very small 
fraction of individuals had to file individual tax returns and therefore, by 
necessity, we must restrict our analysis to the top 0.1% of the income 
distribution (and for 1933-1949 even the top 0.01%). From 1981 on, we can 
analyze the top 10% of the income distribution. Spain has adopted an annual 
personal wealth tax since 1978. Detailed statistics on the ‘new’ income and 
wealth tax have started to be published in 1981 and 1982 respectively.5 The 
progressive wealth tax has high exemption levels and only the top 2% or 3% 
wealthiest individuals file wealth tax returns. Thus, we limit our analysis of 
wealth concentration to the top 1% and above, and for the period 1982 to 
2004. For 1981 to the present, estimates are based on Spain excluding two 
autonomous regions: Pais Vasco and Navarra, because they manage the 
income tax directly and hence are excluded from the statistics. Those two 
regions represent about 10% of Spain in terms of population and income. 
From 1933 to 1935, estimates are based on all Spain; Navarra is excluded 
since 1937 and Alava (one of the three provinces from the Pais Vasco) since 
1943.  
Our top groups are defined relative to the total number of adults (aged 
20 and above) from the Spanish census (not the number of tax returns 
                                                
5 The official publication exists since 1979 for the income tax and since 1981 for the wealth 
tax. However, the statistical quality of the data for the first years is defective with obvious and 
large inconsistencies which make the data non usable. 
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actually filed). For example, in 2004, there are 30,718,000 adults in Spain 
(excluding Pais Vasco and Navarra) and hence the top 1% represents the top 
307,180 tax filers, etc. The Spanish income tax is individually based since 
1988 (although joint filing remains possible, it is always advantageous to file 
separately when both spouses have incomes). Before 1988, the Spanish 
income tax was family based. We correct our estimates for 1981-1987 using 
the micro-data (which allow to compute both family and individual income 
after the reform) in order to account for this change in law.6 
 We define income as gross income before all deductions and including 
all income items reported on personal tax returns: salaries and pensions, self-
employment and unincorporated business net income, dividends, interest, 
other investment income and other smaller income items. Realized capital 
gains are also included in the tax base since 1979 (but were excluded from 
the base in the earlier period). In order to create comparable series before 
and after 1979, we also estimate series excluding capital gains for the period 
1981-2004. Our income definition is before personal income taxes and 
personal payroll taxes but after employers’ payroll taxes and corporate 
income taxes. 
The wealth tax is a progressive tax on the sum of all individual wealth 
components net of debts with a significant top rate of 2.5% in the top bracket 
for very large wealth holdings.7 In general, real estate wealth is not taxed 
according to its market value but according to its registry value (“catastro”) for 
property tax purposes. Market prices are about 2 to 3 times as high as registry 
value on average. Real estate wealth is a very large component of wealth in 
Spain. Therefore, we use two definitions of wealth, one including real estate 
wealth evaluated at market prices and one excluding real estate wealth (and 
excluding also mortgage debt on the passive side) which we call financial 
wealth. Total wealth is clearly a better measure of wealth but is not directly 
measured in the wealth tax statistics and hence requires making large 
                                                
6 The old income tax was based on individual income from 1933 to 1939 and based on family 
income from 1940 on. We do not correct estimates for the 1940-1971 period because, at the 
very top of the distribution, we expect spouses’ incomes to be small during that period where 
very few married women worked. 
7 The wealth tax has always been individually based and not family based. 
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adjustments. Financial wealth is a more narrow definition of wealth but it is 
better measured in tax statistics.  
Our main data consist of tables displaying the number of tax returns, 
the amounts reported, and the income or wealth composition for a large 
number of income brackets. As the top tail of the income distribution is very 
well approximated by Pareto distributions, we can use simple parametric 
interpolation methods to estimate the thresholds and average income levels 
for each fractile. This method follows the classical study by Kuznets, 1953 and 
has been used as well as in all the top income studies presented in Atkinson 
and Piketty, 2007. In the case of Spain, a very large cross-section of 
individual micro tax data over sampling high incomes is available for year 
2002. A 2 percent panel of tax returns is also available from 1982 to 1998. 
Therefore, we use the micro data to check the validity of our estimations 
based on published tax statistics. We find that our tabulations based 
estimates are almost always very close (within 2-5 percent) to the micro-data 
based estimates, giving us confidence that the errors due to interpolation are 
fairly modest.8 
In order to estimate shares of income, we need to divide the income 
amounts accruing to each fractile by an estimate of total personal income 
defined ideally as total personal income reported on income tax returns had 
everybody been required to file a tax return. Because only a fraction of 
individuals file a tax return (especially in the pre-1979 era), this total income 
denominator cannot be estimated using income tax statistics and needs to be 
estimated using National Accounts9 and the GDP series created by Prados de 
la Escosura, 2003 for the pre-1979 period. For the recent period 1981-2004, 
we approximate the ideal income denominator as the sum of (1) total wages 
and salaries (net of social security contributions) from National Accounts, (2) 
50% of Social Transfers from National Accounts (as pensions, which 
represent about half of such transfers, are taxed under the income tax), (3) 
66.6% of unincorporated business income from National Accounts (as we 
                                                
8 We also use the micro-data to produce estimates on top wage income shares as the micro-
data allow us to rank tax filers by size of wages and salaries. 
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estimate that about 1/3 of such business income is from the informal sector 
and hence escapes taxation), (4) all capital income reported on tax returns (as 
capital income is very concentrated, non-filers receive a negligible fraction of 
capital income10). Our denominator for the 1981-2004 period is around 66% of 
Spanish GDP (excluding Pais Vasco and Navarra) with small fluctuations 
across years, which is comparable to other studies in Atkinson and Piketty 
2007. For the pre-1979 period, because there are no detailed personal 
income series in the National Accounts series constructed by Prados de la 
Escosura, we define our denominator as 66% of GDP.11 We proceed similarly 
to compute wealth shares. In that case, we use estimates of aggregate 
financial net wealth and real estate wealth from the Bank of Spain. 
Table 1 gives thresholds and average incomes for a selection of 
fractiles for Spain in 2004. As just mentioned, the average income is 
estimated primarily from National Accounts and hence is largely independent 
of our tax statistics12 and hence not biased downwards because of tax 
evasion or avoidance. 
After analyzing the top share data, we turn to the composition of 
income and wealth. Using published information and a simple linear 
interpolation method, we decompose the amount of income for each fractile 
into employment income, entrepreneurial income (self-employment and small 
business income), capital income, and capital gains (we also check the 
accuracy of our estimation using the micro-tax data for the years when the 
micro-data is available). We divide wealth into real estate (net of mortgage 
                                                                                                                                      
9 Using tax returns to compute the level of top incomes and national accounts to compute the 
total income denominator dates from the famous Kuznets’ study (1953) on American 
inequality. This method is also used is most of the studies compiled in Atkinson and Piketty, 
2007.  
10 For example, in 2002, the top 10% income earners (representing about one fifth of all tax 
filers as only about half of adults file taxes) obtained 65% of total capital income reported on 
tax returns. Capital income in personal income in National Accounts is substantially different 
from capital income on tax returns because of imputed rents of homeowners, imputed interest 
to bank account holders, returns on (non-taxable) pension funds, etc. That is why we use 
capital income from tax returns to define our denominator. See e.g. Park 2000, for a 
comprehensive comparison in the case of the United States where over 90% of adults file tax 
returns. 
11 We take into account the exclusion of Navarra since 1937 and that of Alava since 1943. 
12 It is important to note that average incomes are low because they include a large number of 
non working adults (such as non working wives or students) with either no or very small 
individual incomes who rely on other family members’ income. 
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debt), fixed claim assets, corporate stocks, and other components (net of non 
mortgage debts). 
 
2.2 The issue of Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
 
Income tax data have hardly been used before to study income 
concentration, especially prior to 1979, because there is a widely held view 
that income tax evasion in Spain was very high, and that consequently, the 
income tax data vastly under-estimate actual incomes.13 A careful analysis of 
the income tax statistics shows that evasion and avoidance in Spain at the 
very top of the distribution during the first decades of existence of the tax was 
most likely not significantly higher than it was in other countries such as the 
United States or France. It is therefore critical to understand the roots of this 
widely held view, which is based on two main arguments. 
First, very few individuals were paying income tax and the individual 
income tax was raising a very small amount of revenue relative to GDP. 
Second, the administration did not have the means to enforce the income tax, 
especially when the exemption thresholds were significantly reduced in the 
1960s, and when tax filers could very easily exaggerate their deductions to 
avoid the tax.  
The first argument is factually true as only about 1,500 individuals paid 
taxes in 1933 (about 0.01% of all adults), and throughout the 1950s and 
1960s the number of taxpayers rarely exceeded 40,000 (about 0.2% of all 
adults). Combined with relatively low tax rates (except at the very top 
brackets), it is therefore not surprising that the income tax was only raising 
between 0.03% of GDP in 1933 and 0.22% of GDP in 1978.14 However, 
extremely high exemption levels can very well explain such facts even in the 
absence of tax evasion. Indeed, in 1933, the filing threshold was 100,000 
                                                
13 Comín, 1994 and Comín and Zafra Oteyza, 1994 provide a historical account on the issues 
of fiscal fraud and tax amnesties over the last century in Spain; Díaz Fuentes, 1994 focuses 
on the period 1940-1990. For the view that income tax evasion was very high in the pre-1979 
period, see Breña Cruz et al. 1974, Castillo Lopez, 1992, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1973, 
Martí Basterrechea, 1974..  
14 We report in appendix Table G the revenue (as a share of GDP) of each tax source in 
Spain between 1930 and 2005, based on Comín, 1985 and Instituto de Estudios Fiscales-
BADESPE. 
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Pesetas, that is, 66 times the average income per adult (equal to around 
1,500 Pesetas based on our denominator estimation described in Section 
2.1).15 Our series will show that income concentration based on those tax 
statistics was very high in the 1930s (about twice as high as in recent 
decades), and actually not much lower than levels estimated for the United 
States or France. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the number of 
filers and income reported at the very top are unreasonably low. 
The second argument that enforcement was poor also needs to be 
qualified. It is undoubtedly true that the 1964-1967 income tax reform that 
eliminated the high exemption levels failed to transform the income tax into a 
mass tax as the fiscal administration kept using de facto high exemption 
levels and did not try to make taxpayers with incomes below 200,000 or even 
300,000 Pesetas pay the tax (Martí Basterrechea, 1974).  
However, there are three main reasons to believe that enforcement for 
very top taxpayers remained acceptable under the old income tax for most of 
the period for which we have data. First, historically, early progressive income 
tax systems always use very high exemption levels and therefore only a very 
small fraction of the population at the top was liable for the tax. The rationale 
for using income taxes on the very rich only is precisely because, at the early 
stages of economic development with substantial economic activity taking 
place in small businesses with no verifiable accounts, it is much easier to 
enforce a tax on a small number of easily identifiable individuals. The rich are 
identifiable because they are well known in each locality and they derive their 
incomes from large and modern businesses with verifiable accounts, or from 
highly paid (and verifiable) salaried positions, or property income from publicly 
known assets (such as large land estates with regular rental income).16 
Therefore, the small size of the Spanish income tax is due to the fact that it 
                                                
15 For further comparisons, in 1933, the annual salary of a qualified officer to the government 
statistics bureau was 4,000 pesetas, while a high-ranking postal service employee received 
11,000 pesetas per year (Gaceta de Madrid, 12/31/1933). 
16 Seligman (1911) is the classical reference on the history of early income taxes. The studies 
gathered in Atkinson and Piketty, 2007 all show that the early income taxes in Western 
countries were limited to a small number of tax filers. All those studies show that income 
concentration measures derived from those early income tax statistics are always very high 
suggesting that enforcement of the income tax on the rich was acceptable. The case of 
Japan, which started an income tax in 1887 shows that a pre-industrial economy significantly 
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was a tax limited to the very rich and should not be interpreted as the 
consequence of poor enforcement.17 Indeed, official statistics show that the 
administration was able to audit a very significant fraction of individual tax 
returns in the pre-1960 period. The audit rates were on average around 10-
20% and hence significantly higher than today (see Table F2 and Table F3 in 
appendix). It is likely that audit rates were even higher for the top 2,000 
income earners in the top 0.01%.  
Second, when the progressive income tax was started, Spain had 
already set in place schedule income taxes on wages and salaries, rents, 
corporate profits, business profits, and capital income.18 As a result, most of 
the income components of the rich were already being taxed through those 
schedule taxes, which offered an alternative way to verify the incomes of the 
rich.19 Furthermore, like France, Spain also adopted and used presumptive 
income taxation based on external signs of wealth (such as ownership of cars, 
planes, or yachts, or employment of domestic workers) in cases where the 
administration suspected tax evasion or avoidance.20  
Third, the administration also threatened to make public the list of 
taxpayers in order to shame prominent tax evaders (Albiñana, 1969a). Such 
                                                                                                                                      
less advanced than Spain in the 1930s could successfully enforce a tax on the rich (Moriguchi 
and Saez, 2007). The Spanish case seems to follow this general pattern as well. 
17 In the discussions leading to the creation of the income tax during 1932, it was recognized 
that enforcement would be acceptable only if the exemption threshold was chosen high 
enough. The parliamentary debates show that, although some congressmen considered that 
the exemption level was too high, it was recognized that the tax authority lacked both the 
managerial capabilities and the necessary human resources to administer a broader income 
tax (Vallejo Pousada, 1995). Most Western countries broadened their income tax during 
extraordinary events such as the World Wars, and this required a very large administrative 
effort. 
18 The time series of the revenue raised by each of those schedule taxes are compiled is 
reported in appendix Table G. 
19 Crosschecking of income tax returns with the schedule income tax returns did take place, 
as stated, for instance, in Albiñana et al., 1974 and Gota Losada, 1966. Starting in 1933, the 
administration prepared personal listings with information from all schedule taxes in order to 
identify individuals with very high incomes. Along the same lines, in 1940 the government 
launched the ‘Registro de Rentas y Patrimonios,’ (Registry of Income and Wealth) in which 
information from personal wealth was gathered with the aim of assisting income tax audits. 
Additionally, the high level of land ownership concentration allowed local tax authorities to 
identify large estate proprietors and rents for rural rent tax purposes (see, for instance, 
Carrión, 1972, 1973, and Alvarez Rey, 2007). 
20 According to Albiñana et al., 1974, Castillo Lopez, 1992 and Martí Basterrechea, 1974, 
extraordinary deductions were among the main sources for tax evasion after the reform of 
1964-1967. Tax statistics report the amount of extraordinary deductions, which are only 
around 5% of income in the late 1950s. Our series are estimated based on income before 
deductions and thus are not biased downwards due to excessive deductions. 
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lists were published for tax years 1933, 1934, and 1935 in the official state 
bulletin. Those lists show that virtually all the largest aristocratic real estate 
owners among the ‘Grandes de España’ (the highest nobility rank), were 
taxpayers, demonstrating that the traditional aristocracy could not evade 
entirely the income tax.21 
Contemporaneous observers (Albiñana 1969a,b, Gota Losada, 1970) 
suggest that enforcement deteriorated during the last decade of Franco’s 
regime.22 This view is based primarily on the fact that the 1964-1967 reform 
virtually eliminated exemptions and transformed the income tax in a mass tax, 
linked to schedule taxes. In practice however, the income tax remained a tax 
on very high incomes only as the mass tax was not enforced. Therefore, a 
much more accurate statement is that the Spanish income tax could not 
become a mass tax (as this happened in most Western countries around the 
mid-20th century) without a significant administrative effort that the Franco 
regime never seriously attempted, hence giving the impression that the tax 
was primitive and poorly enforced relative to other countries.23 However, this 
does not mean that the Spanish income tax was not properly enforced on very 
top incomes, and most of the hard evidence that we have been able to gather 
points toward enforcement levels and techniques for the very top of the 
distribution, that were comparable to those used in other countries. 
                                                
21 In 1932, the list of all the Grandes de España (who were part of the land reform 
expropriation) was published in the Gaceta de Madrid (12/16/1932). Carrion, 1973, provides 
details of the land area owned by the largest estate proprietors among them. By comparing 
these lists and the income tax lists it turns out that 100% of owners of more than 3,000 
hectares were income taxpayers (36 people). If proprietors of more than 1,000 hectares are 
considered (65 people), 92% are present in the tax lists. It should be pointed out that this 
does not imply that the missing 8% were necessarily evaders; in most cases their ascendants 
paid the income tax, which reflects different timing between land ownership transfers and 
nobility title transfers (due, for example, to male preference). Additionally, close inspection of 
the income tax lists shows that over one tenth of all taxpayers in 1933-1935 were either 
Grandes or close relatives. 
22 The economic historian Francisco Comín reported to us a well-known story: during the final 
period of the dictatorship, the commission in charge of redesigning the income tax asked the 
fiscal authorities for the list of top taxpayers. Strikingly, the top of list consisted in famous 
bullfighters and show business stars rather than bankers or large business owners. 
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any written reference on this and it is possible that 
the story has been widely exaggerated as it was told and re-told overtime. As just discussed, 
the published lists of taxpayers in 1933-1935 provide hard evidence that goes in the opposite 
direction. 
23 Fiscal inspectors were highly regarded from a social point of view, and their work should not 
be questioned. Many of them have extensively written on income tax issues, as Albiñana, 
1969a,b, Albiñana et al., 1974, Breña Cruz et al., 1974, Gota Losada, 1966, 1970, Martí 
Basterrachea, 1974, and many others. 
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3. Top Income Shares and Composition  
 
3.1 Top Income Shares 
 
Figure 1 displays the average personal income per adult estimated 
from National Accounts that is used as the denominator for our top income 
shares estimations along with the price index for the period 1932 to 2004. As 
discussed in the introduction and as shown in Prados de la Escosura, 2003, 
2006b, 2007a, real economic growth (per capita) was negative from 1930 to 
the early 1950s. Rapid economic growth started in the 1950s. Growth was 
fastest in the 1960s. Economic growth stalled during the transition period to 
democracy and the first years of the democracy from 1975 to 1985, and then 
resumed again.  
Figure 2 displays the top 0.01% income share from 1933 to 2004. The 
break from 1971 to 1981 denotes the change from the old income tax to the 
new income tax. Four important findings emerge from this figure. 
First, the highest income concentration occurs in the 1930s. The top 
0.01% share was around 1.5% and about twice as high as in the recent 
period. This finding is not surprising as Spain was a country with low average 
income and with high concentration of wealth and, in particular, land 
ownership.24 However, lack of any statistics on income or wealth 
concentration made this claim impossible to establish rigorously. The use of 
the old income tax statistics demonstrates that Spanish income concentration 
was indeed much higher in the pre-civil war period than it is today.25 
Interestingly, tax statistics providing the composition of reported top incomes 
show that taxpayers in 1941 (representing the top 0.03%) obtained about 
20% of their income from returns on real estate (rents), 35% from returns on 
financial assets, 25% from non farm business income, 5% from farm business 
income, and about 15% from employment income (see Table H in appendix). 
                                                
24 The land reform of the Second Republic was not successful in redistributing large land 
estates and was eventually abandoned (see Malefakis, 1971 and Carrión, 1973). 
25 If tax evasion at the very top was higher in the 1930s than today, then this reinforces our 
finding that income concentration was higher in the 1930s. However, as we argued above, we 
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This suggests that, at the beginning of the Franco regime, only a minority of 
top income earners were passive landowners deriving all their income from 
rents (the traditional image of the agrarian aristocracy of the ‘Grandes de 
España,’ mainly concentrated in the central and southern areas of the 
country). Top income earners were much more likely to be also owners of 
financial assets and non-farm businesses. 
Second, the old income tax statistics display a large decrease in the 
top 0.01% income share from 1.4% 1941 to 0.6% in the early 1950s, during 
the first decade of the Franco dictatorship. We have argued in Section 2.2 that 
there is no compelling hard evidence suggesting a deterioration of 
enforcement at the very top of the distribution and, therefore, we conclude 
that the poor economic management and the turn toward economic autarchy 
did not benefit top incomes and actually reduced income concentration in 
Spain. By 1953, the composition of top incomes had changed significantly 
relative to 1941: the fraction of non-farm business income has dropped from 
26% to 9% while the fraction of farm business income has increased from less 
than 5% to over 20%.26 This suggests that the closing of the Spanish 
economy in the 1940s lead to a sharp reduction in successful non-farm 
business enterprises and as a result, non-farm business owners were 
replaced by large farm business owners at the top of the distribution. 
Third, top income concentration estimated with income tax statistics 
remains around 0.6% from 1953 to 1971, the last year for which old income 
tax statistics are available, suggesting that the high economic growth starting 
the 1950s did not bring a significant change in income concentration. 
Interestingly, the level of income concentration measured with the new 
income tax statistics in the early 1980s is quite similar to the level of 1971. 
Assuming again a constant level of enforcement from 1971 to 1981, this 
suggests that the transition from dictatorship to democracy was not 
associated with a significant change in income concentration. Comparing the 
change in income composition in the top 0.05% from 1961 to 1981 is 
interesting: in the capital income category, there is a dramatic shift away from 
                                                                                                                                      
did not find compelling arguments showing that enforcement at the top was particularly poor 
in the 1930s.  
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real estate to financial assets and in the business income category, there is a 
dramatic shift away from farm income toward non farm business income. This 
shows that the very fast economic expansion from 1961 to 1981 made 
traditional land and farm owners fall behind other business owners at the top 
of the distribution. Our top income share series show, however, that such a 
shift took place with no change in overall income concentration. 
Finally, Figure 2 shows that there are fluctuations in very top income 
concentration since 1981 with sharp increases in the late 1980s and the late 
1990s. At the peak of 2000, top 0.01% income earners captured 0.86% of 
total income while they earned only 0.53% of total income in 1993. 
In light of our discussion in the introduction about the specific economic 
and political trajectory of the Spanish economy relative to other western 
countries analyzed previously, it is interesting to compare the trends in 
income concentration between Spain and other countries. Figure 3 displays 
the top 0.01% income share in Spain, France (from Piketty, 2001 and 
Landais, 2007), and the United States (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Two points 
are worth noting. 
First, Spain starts with a level of income concentration in the 1930s that 
is slightly lower than France or the United States. However, income 
concentration in France and the United States falls more sharply than in Spain 
during World War II. Therefore, from the mid-1940s to 1971, income 
concentration across the three countries is actually strikingly close.27 This 
shows that the number of high income taxpayers is not inherently too low in 
Spain relative to other countries and supports our claim that enforcement at 
the top of the distribution was plausibly comparable across Spain and other 
Western countries. Second, although income concentration has increased in 
Spain in recent decades, this increase is very small relative to the surge 
experienced by top incomes in the United States. Thus, the Spanish 
                                                                                                                                      
26 The share of capital income from financial assets drops slightly from 36% to 29% and the 
share of labor income increases slightly from 13% to 19% from 1941 to 1953. 
27 The series are estimated using similar methodologies across countries although there are 
of course differences in the details. However, it is important to note that the denominator (as a 
fraction of GDP) is comparable across countries and around 60% to 65%. It is actually slightly 
higher in Spain (66% of GDP) than in France (around 60% of GDP on average). 
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experience is actually closer to the one of continental Europe countries such 
as France than Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States.28 
 
3.2. Detailed analysis since 1981 
 
 The tax statistics since 1981 are much more detailed than the old 
income tax statistics. Thus, we can study larger income groups such as the 
top 10% since 1981.  
Figure 4 displays top income shares for three groups within the top 
decile: the bottom half of the top decile (top 10-5%), the next 4% (top 5-1%), 
and the top percentile. In contrast to Figure 2, we now include realized capital 
gains in the top income shares.29 The figure shows that those top income 
shares have evolved quite differently: the top 1% increased very significantly 
from 7.7% in 1981 up to 10.2% in 2004. In contrast, the top 10-5%, and the 
top 5-1% shares actually slightly declined from 1981 and in 2004, with very 
modest fluctuations throughout the period. Therefore the increase in income 
concentration, which took place in Spain since 1981, has been a 
phenomenon concentrated within the top 1% of the distribution. This result 
could not have been derived from survey data, which have too small samples 
and top coding issues to reliably study the top 1%. 
 Figure 5 illustrates this concentration phenomenon further by splitting 
the top 1% into three groups: the top 1-0.5%, the top 0.5-0.1%, and the top 
0.1%. As in Figure 4, the higher the fractile, the higher the increase in the 
share from 1981 to 2004: the top 1-0.5% increases modestly from 2.7 to 2.9 
percent while the top 0.1% increases sharply by over 80% from 2 to 3.6 
percent. 
In order to understand the mechanisms behind this increase in income 
concentration at the top, we next turn to the analysis of the composition of top 
incomes. 
                                                
28 The studies gathered in Atkinson and Piketty (2007) show that Anglo-Saxon countries 
experienced a dramatic increase in income concentration in recent decades while continental 
European countries experiences either no or small increases in income concentration. 
29 To a large extent, realized capital gains were not taxed (and hence not reported) under the 
old income tax. Therefore, for comparison purposes, we also excluded realized capital gains 
in Figures 2 and 3 for the period 1981-2002.  
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Figure 6 displays the share and composition of the top 0.1% income 
fractile from 1981 to 2004. The figure shows that the increase in the top 0.1% 
income share is due solely to two components: realized capital gains and 
wage income. The remaining two components: business income and capital 
income have stayed about constant. The figure shows also that the 1986-
1988 spike was primarily a capital gains phenomenon. In contrast, the wage 
income increase has been a slow but persistent effect, which has taken place 
throughout the full period. Capital gains tend to be volatile from year to year 
as they follow closely the large swings of the stock market. Indeed, Figure 7 
displays the total real amounts of capital gains reported by the top 1% income 
earners along with the Madrid SE stock index from Global Financial data on a 
log scale from 1981 to 2004. The two series are strikingly correlated. 
Therefore, the capital gain component reflects largely stock market 
fluctuations. High-income individuals own a disproportionate fraction of 
corporate stock in the economy. When stock prices increase sharply as in the 
late 1980s or late 1990s, high incomes get a disproportionate share of the 
corresponding capital gains, explaining why top income shares tend to follow 
the stock market cycles. 
Figure 8 reports series of wage concentration (based on micro tax 
statistics) for the period 1982-2002. It is important to keep in mind that those 
series capture only wage income concentration and hence are silent about 
changes in business and capital income concentration. The wage series for 
1982-2002 based on tax return data show that there has been a steady 
increase in wage concentration during the last two decades. This increase 
has taken place primarily within the top 1%, which has increased significantly 
from 4.3% in 1982 to 6.5% in 2002. 
 
4. Top Wealth Shares and Composition 
 
In order to cast light on the capital income component of the income 
concentration series we discussed, we now turn to top wealth shares 
estimated from the wealth tax statistics. Figure 9 displays the evolution of 
average wealth (total net worth of the household sector divided by the total 
number of individuals aged 20 and above) and its composition from 1981 to 
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2004. Those average wealth statistics come solely from National Accounts 
and are hence fully independent from wealth tax statistics. 
Three elements should be noted. First, wealth has increased very 
quickly during that period, substantially faster than average income: average 
wealth in 2004 is 2.4 times higher than in 1982 while average income in 2004 
is only 1.5 times higher than in 1982. Second, real estate is an extremely 
large fraction of total wealth. It represents about 80% of total wealth 
throughout the period. Third and related, the growth in average wealth has 
been driven primarily by real estate price increases, and to a smaller degree 
by an increase in corporate stock prices. In contrast, fixed claim assets have 
grown little during the period. 
Figure 10 displays the composition of wealth in top fractiles of the 
wealth distribution in 1982 and 1999. As one would expect, the share of real 
estate is declining and the share of stocks is increasing as we move up the 
wealth distribution. It is notable that real estate still represents over 60% of 
wealth for the bottom half of the top percentile. Thus, only the very rich hold a 
substantial share of their wealth in the form of stock holdings. The patterns in 
1982 and 1999 are quite similar except that the level of stock ownership is 
higher across the board in 1999, a year with high stock market prices. Those 
compositional patterns suggest that an increase in real estate price will benefit 
relatively less the very top and should therefore reduce the very top wealth 
shares. In contrast, an increase in stock prices will benefit disproportionately 
the very rich and should increase the very top wealth shares. 
Figure 11 displays the top 1% wealth share (net worth including real 
estate wealth) along with the top 1% financial wealth share (net worth 
excluding real estate wealth and mortgage debts). Unsurprisingly, the top 
financial wealth share is larger than the top wealth share because financial 
wealth is more concentrated than real estate wealth. Top financial wealth 
concentration is stable around 25% from 1982 to 1990, decreases to about 
21% from 1990 to 1995 and then increases again to about 26% by 2004. In 
contrast the top 1% wealth share including real estate is much more stable 
and fluctuates within a narrow band between 16 and 18 percent. In contrast to 
financial wealth, total wealth concentration does not fall from 1990 to 1995 
because, as shown on Figure 9, real estate wealth also falls in that period, 
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and this advantages top wealth holders. The reverse happens from 1995 to 
2004: in contrast to financial wealth, total wealth concentration does not 
increase because real estate prices increase sharply.  
Figure 12 decomposes the top 1% total wealth share into three groups: 
the top 0.1%, the next 0.4%, and the bottom half of the top percentile. The 
graph shows that those top wealth groups have experienced different 
patterns. The top 0.1% share has fallen substantially from 8% in 1982 to 5% 
by 2004. In contrast, the top 1-0.5% has increased from 4.3 to 5.2 percent 
and the top 0.5-0.1% has slightly decreased from 7.6 to 7.2 percent. Those 
differential patterns are due primarily to composition effects: the bottom 
groups in the top percentile hold mostly real estate and have benefited from 
the surge in real estate prices. In contrast, the top 0.1% has been hit by the 
sharp real estate prices increases from 1986 to 1991 (see Figure 9). The 
improvement in real estate prices from 1997 to 2004 has been compensated 
by a surge in stock prices leading to an overall flat pattern for the top 0.1% 
wealth share during this period. 
Figure 13 displays the wealth composition of top 0.1% wealth holders 
from 1982 to 2004. It shows that the shares of real estate, business assets, 
and fixed claim assets have been decreasing and that the share of stocks has 
been increasing but not enough to compensate for the fall in the other 
components. Therefore, over the last two decades, the dramatic increase in 
real estate prices has been the primary cause of the reduction in the 
concentration of wealth in Spain.  
In 2002 the Bank of Spain conducted a household wealth survey 
whose preliminary results are presented in Bover, 2004. It is instructive to 
compare the wealth reported on wealth tax returns with the wealth reported in 
the survey. The complete comparison is reported in Table E3 in the appendix. 
Three important findings emerge. 
First, we find that wealth reported on wealth tax statistics for top 
income groups such as the top 1% is higher than the wealth reported on the 
survey by the top 1%, even under the assumption that all the household 
wealth belongs to the head of household. For example, including real estate, 
the average top 1% wealth from tax returns is 1.8 million Euros while it is only 
1.2 million in the survey. This shows that, in contrast to popular belief, it is not 
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clear that tax evasion for the wealth tax is pervasive as wealthy individuals 
seem to report more wealth for tax purposes than for the survey purposes. 
Second, the total wealth reported in the survey (and especially financial 
wealth) is substantially lower than the aggregates from National Accounts that 
we use as the denominator. For example, the survey reports total wealth of 
about 2,000 billion Euros while National Accounts report total wealth of about 
3,000 billions Euros. This suggests that households are under-reporting their 
wealth in the survey or that the survey might not have been sampled 
adequately to reflect a fully representative cross section of Spanish 
households. 
Finally, because the gap in the aggregate between the survey and 
National Accounts and the gap for top groups between the survey and the 
wealth tax data are of comparable magnitude, our top wealth shares 
computed using wealth tax statistics and National Accounts for the 
denominator are relatively close to the top wealth shares computed internally 
from the survey (using as denominator total survey wealth). 
 
5. The Erosion of the Wealth Tax Base 
 
In 1994, an exemption for business owners substantially involved in the 
management of their business was introduced in the wealth tax. More 
precisely, stocks of corporations where the individual owns at least 15%, or 
the individual and family own at least 20%, and where the individual is 
substantially engaged in this business activity (getting over 50% of his labor 
and business income from this activity) is exempted from the wealth tax. The 
value of those stocks still has to be reported to the fiscal administration and 
was included in our top wealth share series. The exemption was introduced in 
December 1993 for the first time, affecting wealth held by the end of 1994 
(reported in 1995). Importantly for the empirical analysis below, the exemption 
criteria were relaxed for tax year 1995 (when the individual ownership 
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requirement was lowered from 20% to 15%) and in tax year 1997 (when the 
20% family ownership criteria was introduced).30 
 
5.1 Conceptual Model 
 
In principle, the 1994 wealth tax reform could have two effects. First, 
the tax cut for exempted business might spur business activity in the 
exempted sector. We call this effect the supply side effect. Second, the tax cut 
for exempted business might induce some businesses, which did not 
originally meet the exemption criteria, to shift to the exempt sector in order to 
benefit from the tax cut. For example, business owners could increase their 
share of stock in the company in order to meet the 15% ownership threshold. 
Alternatively, they might become active managers in their businesses or drop 
other work activities outside the business. A business owner would be willing 
to shift to the exempt sector as long as the costs of shifting are less than the 
tax savings. We call this effect the shifting effect. In this subsection, we 
construct a simple model to capture those two effects and we propose an 
empirical application using our constructed wealth series in the following 
subsection.31  
We assume that business owners have an objective function of the 
form 
! 
c " h(z) where 
! 
z  is pre-tax profits, 
! 
c  is net-of-tax profits, and 
! 
h(z)  is an 
increasing and convex function representing the costs of earning higher 
profits. Those costs represent labor input costs (including the labor supply 
cost of the business owner if he is an active manager) and also capital input 
costs. The quasi-linear form of the objective function amounts to assuming 
away income effects or risk aversion effects, which simplifies the derivations 
                                                
30 For tax year 2003 (beyond our study), the individual ownership requirement was further 
reduced from 15% to 5%. 
31 To the best of our knowledge, such a model has not been presented before in the literature 
on the efficiency costs of taxation. It could be easily applied to other tax settings. For 
example, in the United States, the issue of shifting business profits from the corporate income 
tax base to the individual income tax base has received a lot of attention (see e.g., Slemrod, 
1995, 1996, Gordon and Slemrod, 2000, Saez, 2004). Such shifting occurs because 
businesses meeting specific criteria (number of shareholders) can elect to be taxed directly at 
the individual level. 
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and the welfare analysis.32 Furthermore, we assume that the business owner 
can pay a cost 
! 
q " 0 in order to meet the tax exemption status. Such costs 
represent for example the costs of increasing the business ownership to 15% 
or the opportunity costs of dropping outside work activities to meet the labor 
income requirement. We assume that 
! 
q is distributed according to a 
cumulated distribution 
! 
P(q) . A fraction 
! 
P
0
= P(q = 0)  of businesses meet those 
criteria even in the absence of the tax preference. In reality, businesses differ 
in size, which could be modeled through heterogeneity in the cost function 
! 
h(z) . However, as we consider only linear taxation (which is an approximation 
to the actual progressive tax system), the distribution of business sizes is 
irrelevant for the analysis and hence we assume that businesses differ only in 
! 
q. 
We assume that the tax rate on profits 
! 
z  in the taxed sector is 
! 
"
0
 and 
that the tax rate in the exempt sector is 
! 
"
1
 with of course 
! 
"
1
# "
0
. Note that 
! 
"
1
 
is not necessarily zero as the business also faces corporate and individual 
income taxes. It is also important to note that we convert the wealth tax rate 
! 
t  
into a tax rate 
! 
"  on profits using the standard formula 
! 
" = t r  where 
! 
r  is the 
normal annual return on assets. We denote by 
! 
l the tax status of the business 
with 
! 
l = 0 denoting the standard taxable status and 
! 
l =1 the exempt status. 
The manager solves the following maximization problem: 
 
! 
max
l ,z
z(1" # l ) " h(z) " q $ l  
 
This maximization problem can be decomposed into two stages. First, 
conditional on 
! 
l, 
! 
z  maximizes 
! 
z(1" #
l
) " h(z) which generates the first order 
condition 
! 
1" #
l
= h'(z) . This equation captures the within sector supply side 
effect, as a decrease in 
! 
"
l
 leads to an increase in 
! 
z
l
 with an elasticity 
! 
e
l
= 1" #
l( ) zl( )$zl $ 1" # l( ) = h'(zl ) zlh' ' zl( )( ) . 
                                                
32 Including income effects would not change the qualitative nature of our findings but would 
complicate the presentation, as we would have to introduce compensated elasticities to 
capture efficiency costs in our formulas. In the case of wealthy business owners who actively 
work in their business, it seems plausible to assume that income effects are small (if income 
effects were large, those business owners would not be working). 
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Second, the business chooses 
! 
l. We denote by 
! 
V
l
=max
z
z 1" #
l( ) " h(z)[ ]  the indirect utility in each taxable status 
! 
l = 0,1 (not 
including the cost 
! 
q of becoming tax exempt). Therefore, if 
! 
q "V
1
#V
0
, then the 
exempt status 
! 
l =1 is optimal, while if 
! 
q >V
1
"V
0
, then 
! 
l = 0 is optimal. As a 
result, a fraction 
! 
P
*
= P(V
1
"V
0
)  of businesses chooses the exempt status. 
Using the envelope theorem, we have 
! 
"V
l
"#
l
= $z
l
. Therefore, 
! 
"P* "#
0
= p V
1
$V
0( ) % z0  and 
! 
"P* "#
1
= $p V
1
$V
0( ) % z1 , where 
! 
p q( )  denotes the 
density of the distribution 
! 
P q( ) . Unsurprisingly, if there are firms on the margin 
between the tax exempt and taxable status, then increasing the tax 
! 
"
0
 in the 
taxable sector generates a shift toward the tax-exempt sector. Conversely, 
reducing the tax advantage of the exempt sector by increasing 
! 
"
1
 reduces the 
number of firms in the tax-exempt sector. 
We denote by 
! 
T = 1" P*( ) # 0z0 + P*#1z1 the total tax revenue and by 
! 
W = 1" P*( )V0 + V1 " q( )d
0
V
1
"V
0
# P q( ) the private surplus in the economy. Social 
surplus is 
! 
SW =W + T . Routine computations show that: 
 
! 
"T
"#
0
= 1$ P*( )z0 1$
#
0
1$ #
0
e
0
$
p
*
1$ P*
#
0
z
0
$ #
1
z
1( )
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
*   (1) 
! 
"T
"#
1
= P*z
1
1$
#
1
1$ #
1
e
1
+
p
*
P
*
#
0
z
0
$ #
1
z
1( )
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
*    (2) 
 
The first term (equal to one) inside the square brackets of (1) and (2) 
represents the mechanical increase in tax revenue absent any behavioral 
response. The last two terms inside the square brackets represent the loss of 
tax revenue due to the supply side effect and the shifting effect respectively. 
The reduction in private surplus due to the tax change is equal to the 
mechanical tax increase (absent behavioral responses).33 Therefore, the last 
two terms represent the net effect on social surplus SW of the tax increase or 
equivalently (minus) the marginal deadweight burden of increasing taxes. 
Absent shifting effects 
! 
p
* = 0( ) , we obtain the standard Harberger formula 
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showing that the marginal loss in tax revenue (per dollar) is proportional to the 
supply side elasticity 
! 
e  and the tax rate 
! 
" . 
If the tax rate 
! 
"
0
 in the taxable sector is below the Laffer rate 
maximizing tax revenue (when taking into account only supply side effects) 
then 
! 
"
0
z
0
> "
1
z
1
. Therefore, equation (1) shows that shifting effects increase 
the marginal deadweight burden of increasing the tax in the taxable sector. In 
contrast, equation (2) shows that shifting effects decrease the marginal 
deadweight burden of increasing the tax in the exempt sector. The economic 
intuition is transparent: increasing the tax differential across the two sectors 
leads to more shifting: the marginal shifters spend 
! 
q for a tax saving equal to 
! 
q, which is pure deadweight burden. Strikingly, in the extreme case where 
! 
"
1
= 0,34 
! 
"SW "#
1
= p
*#
0
z
0
P
* : social surplus increases with an increase in 
! 
"
1
 
no matter how large the supply side effect in the tax exempt sector is. 
Therefore, providing a wealth tax exemption for businesses meeting some 
specific set of criteria has two opposite effects on social surplus. First, it has a 
positive effect on social surplus through the standard supply side effect: 
exempt businesses face lower taxes and hence might expand their economic 
activity. This effect is measured through the supply side elasticity 
! 
e . This 
leads to an increase in business activity and hence reported business wealth 
in the exempt sector with no effect on the taxable sector. Second, however, 
the exemption might induce some businesses to shift to the exempt status 
and waste resources in doing so. This shifting effect leads to an increase in 
reported business wealth in the exempt sector, which comes at the expense 
of reported business wealth in the taxable sector. We propose an empirical 
estimation using our wealth composition series below. 
 
5.2 Empirical Estimation 
 
                                                                                                                                      
33 This can be seen directly from the fact that 
! 
"V
l
"#
l
= $z
l
, which is a direct consequence 
of the envelope theorem. 
34 As we discussed above, even though business owners benefiting from the exemption are 
exempt from the wealth tax, business owners still pay income taxes on the profits so that in 
reality 
! 
"
1
> 0. 
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Figure 14 displays the composition and share of financial wealth held 
by the top 0.01% wealth holders. Stocks are now divided into three 
components: publicly traded stock, taxable closely held stocks, and exempted 
closely held stock. In 1994, the first year the exemption was introduced, 
exempted stock represents only about 15% of total closely held stock reported 
by the top 0.01%. By 2002, the fraction has grown to 77%. Presumably, in 
1994, individuals did not have time to reorganize substantially their business 
activity. Therefore, the 15% fraction of closely held stock benefiting from the 
exemption in 1994 must be close or just slightly above the fraction of closely 
held stock which would benefit from the exemption absent any behavioral 
response to the introduction of the exemption.35 The fraction of business 
exempt wealth grows enormously from 1994 to 2002, which is consistent 
either with a very large supply side effect or a significant shifting effect. 
However, the fraction of taxable closely held stocks shrinks significantly from 
1994 to 2002 which strongly suggests that the great increase in tax exempt 
wealth comes, at least in part, at the expense of taxable wealth through the 
shifting channel. We use our series to quantify the relative size of each effect. 
We propose a simple quantitative analysis using our estimated series 
and the model described above. Let us assume that, taking the tax or exempt 
status as fixed, business wealth is given by 
! 
z = z 1" #( )
e
 where 
! 
"  is the total 
tax rate (including income and wealth taxes) on profits, 
! 
e  is the supply side 
elasticity, and 
! 
z  is potential wealth absent any taxes. We assume that the 
fraction of businesses in the tax-exempt sector is given by 
! 
P = P "
0
,"
1( ). We 
use subscript 
! 
b to denote before reform variables and subscript 
! 
a  to denote 
after reform variables. Hence 
! 
P
b  is the fraction of businesses meeting the 
exemption criteria just before the reform and 
! 
P
a  is the fraction of businesses 
meeting the exemption criteria after the reform. Hence 
! 
P
b
" P
a  captures the 
shifting effect (purged from the supply side effect) 
For a given top group (such as the top 1% or the top 0.01%), after the 
reform, we observe exempt closely held stocks 
! 
P
a
z 
a
1" #
0( )
e
 and non-exempt 
                                                
35 Those would be businesses for which the cost of shifting 
! 
q was zero because the 
businesses already met the criteria. 
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closely held stock 
! 
1" P
a( )z a 1" #1( )
e
. Before the reform, we observe only the 
total closely held stocks held by the top group 
! 
P
b
z 
b
1" #
0( )
e
+ 1" P
b( )z b 1" # 0( )
e
 
as there is no distinction between taxable and exempt stock. 
We estimate 
! 
"
0 and 
! 
"
1 as the sum of the income tax on profits and the 
wealth tax. We assume that the income tax on profits (corporate income tax if 
the business is incorporated or individual income tax is the business is 
unincorporated and taxed directly at the individual level) is 30% for the top 1% 
wealth holders and 40% for top 0.01% holders. We assume that the wealth 
tax rate (when the business is taxable) is 0.8% of the value of assets for the 
top 1% and 1.3% for the top 0.01%.36 We convert wealth tax rates into an 
implicit tax on profits assuming a return rate on assets equal to 5%. 
Therefore, the total tax rates on profits for non-exempt businesses are 46% 
and 66% for the top 1% and top 0.01% respectively. Although there is 
significant uncertainty about the exact tax rates, they only affect the 
estimation of 
! 
e  (and not 
! 
P
a  and 
! 
P
b ). 
In order to estimate the three key parameters 
! 
e , 
! 
P
a  and 
! 
P
b , and the 
two auxiliary variables 
! 
z 
a  and 
! 
z 
b  from the three observed quantities, we need 
to make two important additional assumptions. First, we assume that the 
fraction of closely held stocks meeting the exemption criteria before the 
reform 
! 
P
b  is given by the observed fraction of stocks meeting the exemption 
the first year the reform is implemented. This assumption is reasonable if 
businesses do not have time to respond to the tax change in the first year 
after the reform. In any case, if businesses start responding in the first year, 
then we will over-estimate 
! 
P
b , hence under-estimate the shifting effect 
! 
P
a
" P
b  
and overestimate the supply side elasticity 
! 
e .37 In the empirical estimation, we 
need to take into account the fact that the wealth tax exemption criteria were 
                                                
36 Those estimates are based on the tabulated data. The wealth tax rates go from 0.2% in the 
lowest bracket to 2.5% in the top bracket but the effective tax rates are substantially lower 
due to numerous exemptions. 
37 A counter argument could be that business owners did not know about the wealth tax 
exemption in the first year after the reform and hence failed to claim it even in cases where 
they were fully eligible. This argument is difficult to believe in the case of large wealth holders 
who use tax accountants to file their taxes. More broadly, the costs of learning about complex 
tax exemptions can be incorporated into the cost 
! 
q of meeting the exemption criteria and our 
model and results would go through unchanged. 
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relaxed in 1995 and in 1997. Therefore, we assume that the growth in the 
fraction exempt from 1994 to 1995 and from 1996 to 1997 is entirely due to 
the relaxation of the criteria (and hence that the fraction exempt would have 
stayed constant absent the relaxation). This is a very conservative estimation 
as the fraction exempt grows in every single year from 1994 to 2002. As a 
result, we assume that the fraction exempt (before the reform) is actually 
about twice as large as the fraction actually exempt in 1994. This conservative 
assumption leads to a conservative estimate of the shifting effect. 
Second, we assume that, absent any tax change, total closely held 
stocks (taxable and non-taxable) would have grown at a rate 
! 
g  equal to the 
growth rate of other financial assets held by the top 1%. In that case, 
! 
z a = (1+ g) " z b  where 
! 
1+ g is taken as the ratio of other financial assets held by 
the top 1% after and before the reform. This is clearly a strong assumption. 
Using our pre-reform series, we show that it holds as a first approximation in 
the pre-reform period.38 Panel A of Table 2 presents those key parameters for 
the top 1% (left panel) and for the top 0.01% (right panel) for various choices 
for the pre-reform base year and the post-reform year. 
With those two assumptions, we can estimate the behavioral 
parameters 
! 
e , 
! 
P
a  and 
! 
P
b , (Panel B in Table 2) as well as evaluate the tax and 
efficiency consequences (Panel C in Table 2). Three important results arise 
from this exercise. First and most important, all the estimates robustly suggest 
that there is a very large shifting effect: the fraction of businesses benefiting 
from the exemption jumps from less than 1/3 to about 2/3 for the top 1%. The 
shifting is even more extreme for the top 0.01% and goes from 37% exempt to 
over 80% exempt. It is important to reiterate that this represents the pure 
shifting effect (controlling for the supply side effect).39 Of course such a large 
shifting effect is not surprising in light of Figure 14 which showed a striking 
drop in taxable closely held wealth compensated by an increase in exempt 
                                                
38 For example from 1982 to 1993, among the top 1%, the (real) growth of other financial 
assets was 63% while the growth of closely held stocks was 44%. However from 1987 to 
1993, closely held stock (in the top 1%) grew faster (37%) than other financial assets (17%). 
39 Such shifting effects are quite robust to assuming a rate of growth of closely held stock that 
is slower (absent any tax change) than other financial assets. For example, one would have 
to assume that closely held assets would have declined by 15% in real terms from 1993 to 
2002 to make the shifting effects disappear for the top 1% group, which seems very 
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closely held wealth. Second, the estimates for the supply side elasticity are 
sensitive to the choice of the comparison years and hence cannot be 
estimated precisely with our series.40 However, the elasticity estimates are 
never extremely large and are often around zero (or even negative). This 
shows that the data series do not display consistent evidence of a very large 
supply side effect. Third and finally, Panel C shows that the combination of 
large shifting effects with moderate supply side elasticity implies that the 
actual tax loss due to the reform is much larger than the predicted tax loss of 
the reform absent any behavioral response. Even in the case of column (1) 
where the supply side elasticity 
! 
e  is largest and equal to 0.83, the actual loss 
in tax revenue from the top 1% wealth holders is larger than the loss in tax 
revenue assuming no behavioral response. When the supply side elasticity 
estimate is smaller, the loss in tax revenue with behavioral responses can be 
three to four times larger than with no behavioral responses. As our 
theoretical model showed, the difference between actual changes in tax 
revenue and predicted changes in tax revenue (absent the behavioral 
response) are a measure of the efficiency costs of the tax change.41 The last 
row in Table 2 displays such an estimated change in total surplus due to the 
tax change. 
Therefore, our estimates suggest that the wealth tax exemption was a 
very inefficient way to provide tax relief: the welfare gain to taxpayers was 
substantially smaller than the loss in tax revenue because resources were 
dissipated by taxpayers in meeting the tax exemption criteria. This ends up 
increasing the deadweight burden of taxation as individuals change their 
behavior in order to benefit from the tax reductions (Feldstein, 1999). Our 
empirical analysis could be made more precise using directly longitudinal 
micro-data on wealth taxpayers. Such data could provide direct evidence of 
shifting and of shifting costs.42 
                                                                                                                                      
unrealistic given the growth that closely held stock experienced in the pre-tax reform period 
from 1982 to 1993. 
40 In contrast to shifting parameters, 
! 
e  is also sensitive to the assumption about the growth 
rate 
! 
g  of closely held assets absent the tax change. 
41 This is exactly true in the case of small tax changes. In the case of the relatively large 
change we are considering, this is only a first order approximation. 
42 Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain access to such data and it is unlikely that 
access could be obtained in the near future. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has attempted to analyze income and wealth concentration 
in Spain from a long-run perspective using the income tax statistics evidence. 
We recognize that our data sources, especially before the return to 
democracy, cover only the very top of the income distribution so that we 
cannot speak to overall income inequality patterns. We have argued, 
however, that the extent of tax evasion at the top of the distribution, was likely 
much lower than commonly thought and that, as a result, those tax statistics 
can cast new useful light on the patterns of income concentration in Spain 
before the return to democracy. 
Our results show that income concentration was much higher during 
the 1930s than it is today: the top 0.01% income share was about twice as 
high in the 1930s than over the last two decades. Income concentration 
dropped during the 1940s and remained fairly stable throughout the Spanish 
economic miracle from the 1950s to the 1970s. During the last two decades, 
income concentration has increased significantly and this phenomenon is 
concentrated in the top 1%, and especially in the top fractiles within the top 
1%. A large fraction of the increase is due to a surge in realized capital gains 
following the stock market boom of the late 1990s and since 2002. The data 
also show evidence of an increase in top salaries, which has contributed to 
the increase in top income shares. It should be noted that the increase in 
income concentration in Spain is much smaller than the increase in 
concentration that took place in the United States. 
 Wealth concentration in Spain has declined modestly since 1982. The 
sharp increase in real estate prices, which tend to reduce wealth 
concentration, have been to a large extent offset by large stock price 
increases, leaving the overall wealth concentration relatively stable. 
The exemption of stocks from the wealth tax base for business owners 
actively involved in managing their business introduced in 1994 constitutes a 
striking example of the perverse effects of eroding the tax base, both on 
efficiency and redistributive grounds. This exemption had a minor effect on 
the tax base initially but now reduces the tax base of the wealthiest taxpayers 
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by about 40%, weakening substantially the redistributive effects of the 
progressive wealth tax. Furthermore, the erosion of the tax base has been 
due primarily to wealthy business owners shifting from the taxable status to 
the non-taxable status. This suggests that, not only the costs of the tax cut are 
much higher than predicted based on a scenario with no behavioral response, 
but also that those tax losses create substantial additional deadweight burden 
as business owners expend significant resources to qualify for the non-
taxable status.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A. The Income and Wealth Tax in Spain 
 
A.1.The “old” income tax 
 
After six unsuccessful attempts since 1910, the first personal income tax 
(Contribución General sobre la Renta) was established in all the territory of 
Spain, including Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, in 1932 (Law 20/12/1932) during the 
Second Republic. Based on their historical autarky privileges, Navarra and 
Alava were excluded since 1937 and 1943 respectively.43 
Taxable income included income from real estate, capital, rural and 
mining activities, commercial and industrial business, labor and pensions. 
Mainly due to the narrow managerial capabilities of the government, this first 
law determined a high taxable income threshold (100,000 pesetas lowered to 
80,000 pesetas in 1936) together with low progressive rates, ranging from 1% 
to 11% (Table F1). In 1933 there were only 1,446 tax returns and income tax 
collection represented 0.03% of GDP and 0.35% of total tax collection (Table 
B3 and Table G). The income tax was based on individual income (as 
opposed to family income) from 1933 to 1939. 
The fiscal reform of 1940 (Law 16/12/1940), which made changes in 
the whole tax system, was mainly motivated by the need to increase fiscal 
revenues to solve the post civil war problems and to cancel war debts. 
Consequently, the reform relied on the traditional schedule income and 
consumption taxes, which were much easier to collect. Concerning the 
Contribución sobre la Renta, it reduced the minimum taxable income to 
70,000 pesetas and substantially increased the progressivity of the rates, with 
a top marginal tax rate of 40% for incomes above 1,000,000 pesetas. It also 
raised the taxes on lower incomes, with the minimum tax rate jumping from 
1% to 7.5%.  It introduced family deductions and a supplementary 30% rate 
for single individuals. The new law applied to 1941 incomes. From 1940 on, 
the income tax was based on family income (instead of individual income from 
1933 to 1939). 
Tax rates were further increased in 1942 (Law 6/2/1943), when the 
minimum threshold was set to 60,000 pesetas. Two new reforms (Law 
16/12/1953 and Law 26/12/1957) failed to generalize the coverage of the tax. 
The definition of “unjustified wealth gains” (defined as those which could not 
                                                
43 The autarky regimes governing the territories of Navarra and País Vasco and their 
relationship with the central administration is not a new issue in the history of Spain. Those 
regimes date back to the XV century. More recently, Navarra’s privilegies were regulated by 
the Ley Paccionada (1841). The Régimen de Concierto was negotiated with Alava, 
Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya in 1877, for which the provinces were responsible for the collection of 
national administration taxes while making lump sum transfers to Madrid.  The 1936-1939 
civil war and Franco’s policy towards ‘traitor’ local nationalisms changed the scenario. On the 
one hand, Alava and Navarra received a preferential treatment and kept their prerogatives 
after their contribution to the war on Franco’s side. On the other, the autarky of Vizcaya and 
Guipúzcoa was abolished in 1937 (Decree Law 23/6/1937), even before the conflict had 
ended. Financial autonomy was recognized again during transition to democracy (Real 
Decreto-Ley 30/10/1976). 
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be explained by declared income flows) for audit purposes helped improve the 
inspection results, and had a positive impact on the tax collection. 
By the mid-1960s the Contribución had been pushed down in the fiscal 
agenda.44  The stabilization plan of 1959 had been extremely successful in 
terms of government revenues so the tax reform of 1964 was not motivated 
by fiscal deficits but to promote growth and development. The Law 11/6/1964 
and the Decree 27/11/1967 made the valuation of taxable income dependent 
on the system of schedule taxes.45 Consequently the personal income tax 
completely lost its autonomy. Theoretically there were no minimum threshold 
to file; however, the usual obligation began at 200,000-300,000 pesetas. Tax 
rates ranged from 15% to 61.4%, with an average maximum rate of 50%.  
The collection results were well below expectations again and the 
situation remained unchanged after the reforms of 1973 and 1975 (Decree 
Laws 12/1973 and 13/1975). The top marginal rate was reduced to 56.12% 
with an average maximum rate of 40%. Finally, and just before the 
introduction of the modern income tax in 1979, the law 50/1977 offered a tax 
amnesty 1976; this was a success as 213,000 tax filers responded positively. 
 
A.2. The modern income tax 
 
The modern income tax was established in 1979 (Law 44/1978), with two 
major reforms in 1991 and 1998. Albi (2006) provides a detailed description of 
the current system along with all the reforms from 1979 to date. 
From 1984 to 1987 the top marginal rate was 66%; however the 
average tax rate could not exceed 46%. In 1988 the tax scale was completely 
restructured downwards; the top marginal rate decreased from 66% to 56%, 
but the 46% limit was eliminated (Table A1, column 9).  
The reform of 1991 did not modify either the tax rates or the main 
deductions. It updated the legislation in terms of individual and joint filing after 
the Constitutional Court decided in 1989 that the obligation to file jointly for 
married couples was thereafter unconstitutional. It also introduced changes in 
the taxation of capital gains, which we briefly describe below. 
Since the reform of 1998 (Law 40/1998), the system was not supposed 
to tax overall but disposable income, after the deduction of a personal and 
family minimum income threshold (family-related reductions existed before, 
but they were applied to the amount of the tax and not to the income). For this 
reason, the joint-filer tax scale disappeared, so that the same scale applies to 
everybody since that year. The reform also meant a general rate reduction in 
the marginal rates. The drops ranged from 2% (from 20% to 18% for the 
bottom bracket) to 8% (from 56% to 48% for the top bracket). It also reduced 
the number of brackets from eight to six and eliminated the 0% rate for the 
lowest income. 
                                                
44 A result of this diminishing relevance is the inexistence of official statistics between 1961 
and 1979. 
45 The powerful banking and industrial sectors, with strong influence in the dictatorship of 
Franco, seem to have been the source of a systematic attempt to block any generalization of 
the Contribución sobre la Renta and to sustain the statu quo of the taxation scheme. See, for 
example, Albiñana, 1969a and Vallejo Pousada, 1995, for details on how some private banks 
sketched income tax codes to be imposed to the government. 
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Concerning capital gains, the following facts are worth mentioning. 
Between 1978 and 1991, capital gains (excluding gratuitous inter-vivos and 
mortis causa transfers) were taxed as regular income, according to the tax 
rate scale. From 1992 to 2004, a distinction was made between short run (or 
‘regular’, meaning below one year) capital gains and long run (or ‘irregular’) 
capital gains. Short run capital gains are added to the main income and taxed 
according to the tax scale.  
Until 1998 long run capital gains were first corrected downwards by a 
coefficient depending both on the nature of the asset and the number of years 
the asset had been held (real estate, -5.26% per year; stock: -11.11% per 
year; -7.14% per year for other assets). Finally, the tax was computed as the 
maximum of (a) adding 50% of irregular capital gains to the regular income 
and applying the tax scale to the result; and (b) applying the individual 
average tax rate to 100% of the irregular gains. Since 1996 the average tax 
rate affecting irregular capital gains could not exceed 20%. 
From 1997 to 1998, long run capital gains generated in one to two 
years continued to follow the rules described above. For those produced in 
more than two years, a 20% rate was applied only to any amount beyond 
200,000 pesetas. 
Since 1999 only gains generated in more than two years are 
considered “irregular” and consequently taxed in a different way from the rest 
of income, at a 20% rate (18% since 2002). 
 
 
A.3. The Wealth Tax 
 
The Law 50/1977 established a “transitory” and “exceptional” tax on net 
wealth, declared and paid annually at the same time as the income tax but on 
a separate form. Originally it was meant to serve as a control over the income 
tax, with limited redistributive goals. Tax filing was done on an individual 
basis, with the exception of married couples under joint tenancy; joint filing 
was optional between 1988 and 1990. 
Concerning taxable wealth and valuation rules: (a) urban real estate 
was valued at property registry values (catastro), corrected by coefficients 
which depended upon the year of construction; (b) rural real estate value was 
the result of capitalizing at 4% the amount fixed by the local estate tax; (c) 
checking, savings accounts and time deposits corresponded to the annual 
average balance, net of any amount used to purchase other components of 
wealth or to cancel debts; (d) life insurance corresponded to recovery value; 
(e) bonds and traded stock, at the monthly average price during the last 
quarter; (f) closely held stock, at liquidating value; (g) small personal goods, 
3% of wealth below 20 million pesetas and 5% beyond; (h) other items, at 
market prices and (i) debts at nominal value. Urban real estate declared 
historical monuments and art works involved in cultural activities were 
exempted. 
Since 1992, a major reform by the Law 19/1991 put an end to the 
transitory an exceptional character of the tax. It established a strictly individual 
filing and introduced changes in some of the included components as well as 
in their valuation rules. In particular, (a) real estate is valued at the highest of 
(i) the property registry value, (ii) the purchasing price, (iii) the value 
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determined for other taxes; (b) checking, savings accounts and time deposits, 
valued at the highest of the final balance or the 4th quarter average balance; 
(c) bonds and traded stock, at the average of market price during the 4th 
quarter; (d) closely held stock, at the theoretical value according to the last 
audited balance; if the audit is still pending the value is obtained from the 
highest of the last audited balance or the average of the last three annual 
profits capitalized at 12.5%;46 (e) life insurance at recovery value; (f) annuities 
at capitalization value; (g) art works and antiques, at market value; (h) 
intellectual and industrial property rights, exempted if belonging to the original 
author and valued at purchasing prices otherwise; (i) other items, at market 
prices and (i) debts, at nominal value. Small personal items and pension 
funds are not taxed. The main residence was exempted up to 25 million 
pesetas (150,253.03 euros) since 2000 (Law 6/2000). 
Of particular importance for Section 5 in the main text, the Law 22/1993 
introduced the following new exemptions, starting in 1994: 
(a) Goods necessary for business activities constituting the main 
income source, performed in a direct and personal way by the individual. 
(b) Closely held stocks of business corporations whenever all three of 
the following conditions were met:  
(i) the individual is substantially engaged in the business activity (he is 
the manager), getting over 50% of his total labor, business and professional 
income from it; 
(ii) the individual owns at least 20% of the capital; 
(iii) the corporation is not involved in wealth management as main 
activity. 
Since 1995 the minimum share requirement was reduced to 15% (Law 
42/1994) for the individual, and set to 20% for the family in 1997 (Law 
13/1996). In 1998, professional activities were also included in the exemption 
mentioned in (a) (Law 66/1997). In 2003, the individual ownership threshold 
was lowered to 5% (Law 51/2002).47 
As of 1/1/1997 the wealth tax revenues were transferred to the local 
governments (Law 46/1996). 
 
B. References on data sources for Spain 
 
Table I summarizes the references on data sources for Spain. 
 
B.1 Tax Statistics 
 
Income tax statistical information covering the “old” income tax was published 
regularly between 1933 and 1961: Dirección General de Rentas Públicas, 
Estadística de la Contribución General sobre la Renta 1933-1934; Dirección 
General de Contribución sobre la Renta, Estadística de la Contribución sobre 
la Renta, 1935-1940, 1941,1942; Dirección General de Contribución sobre la 
Renta, Estadística de Servicios 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 
1950; Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de la Contribución sobre la 
Renta, Estadística de Servicios 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955; Ministerio de 
                                                
46 Capitalization rate was raised to 20% in 1999 (Law 50/1998). 
47 In 1994 the fiscal authorities found it difficult to predict the results of the new exemptions 
(Memoria de la Administración Tributaria 1994, p. 124). 
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Hacienda, Dirección General de Impuestos sobre la Renta, Estadística de 
Servicios de la Contribución sobre la Renta 1956, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1962. 
Tables display the distribution of taxpayers by level of income together with 
taxable income and tax paid. 
There are no official income tax statistics publications from 1962 to 
1979. The Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (1973, 1974) has published a set of 
statistics from unofficial sources covering total tax files between 1963 and 
1974 together with the distribution of files by income brackets for 1971. 
Much more detailed data describe the evolution of the income and 
wealth taxes between 1981 and 2003: Agencia Estatal de la Administración 
Tributaria, Departamento de Informática Tributaria, Madrid, Estadísticas IRPF 
y Patrimonio 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000; Dirección General de Tributos, Subdirección General de Política 
Tributaria (2002), El Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas y el 
Impuesto sobre el Patrimonio en 1999; Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, 
Memoria de la Administración Tributaria, 1982-1983, 1984,  1985, 1986, 
1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005. 
 
B.2 Wages and Salaries 
 
Results displayed in Table D are based on the panel of individual income tax 
returns 1982-1998 (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Panel IRPF-AEAT) and the 
2002 sample of income tax files (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Muestra de 
Declarantes de IRPF 2002). Individual wage incomes are obtained from the 
corresponding box in the tax file. Therefore, Table D includes civil servants. 
As for the denominator, total wages and salaries are defined as total 
employment income from National Accounts, net of social security, and 
excluding País Vasco and Navarra. Total number of employees is total 
salaried employment from National Accounts. As the wages of spouses are 
aggregated for income tax purposes until 1987, we corrected estimates for 
1982-1987 along the same lines as explained in Appendix D.2. 
 
 
C. Wealth and Income Denominators 
 
C.1 Wealth Denominator 
 
In order to compute wealth shares we need to estimate the total personal 
wealth. We have used two definitions of personal wealth: financial wealth 
(wealth excluding pension funds -which are not taxed-, real estate and 
mortgage debt) and total wealth (including real estate and mortgage debt but 
still excluding pension funds). 
The wealth denominator relies on five statistical sources: 
(a) Banco de España (2005), Cuentas Financieras de la Economía Española 
1990-2005. Table II.21, Hogares e Instituciones sin fines de Lucro al servicio 
de los Hogares. 
(b) Banco de España (2004), Encuesta Financiera de las Familias (EEF): 
Descripción, Métodos y Resultados Preliminares, Boletín Económico 11/2004. 
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(c) Banco de España, Indicadores del Mercado de la Vivienda, 
www.bde.es/infoest/sindi.htm, Table sindi15. Data refer to averages in the 4th 
quarter between 1987 and 2004. 
(d) Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Dirección General de Catastro, 
Estadísticas Catastrales 1990-2004. 
http://www.catastro.minhac.es/esp/estadisticas1.asp  
(e) Caixa de Catalunya (2004), Report Monográfico: El Crecimiento del Stock 
de Riqueza de las Familias Españolas y su Impacto sobre el Consumo en el 
Período 1995-2003: Una Version Territorial, in Informe sobre el Consumo y la 
Economía Familiar, June. 
 
Financial Wealth: Financial wealth is defined as the sum of bank deposits, 
currency holdings, stocks and investment funds, other fixed claim assets and 
insurance contracts on the asset side, minus commercial and other credit on 
the liability side.  To match the definition of taxable wealth, we do not include 
pension funds. Also long run loans are excluded as a proxy for mortgage 
debt.  The data were selected from (a) and correspond to the 4th quarter, 
covering the period 1989-2002.  
In order to estimate the financial wealth for the period 1982-1988, we 
proceeded in the following way. The GDP shares of deposits and currency 
holdings, insurance contract net of pensions, other fixed claim assets and 
debts were rather stable for the first years for which data exist (1989-1992); 
consequently we fixed the ratios for 1982-1988 at the 1989 level. On the other 
hand, the stock and investment funds GDP share has displayed an increasing 
tendency during the decade of 1990, in parallel with the Madrid stock market 
index.  Therefore, for 1986-1988, we applied the 1989 stock and investment 
funds/GDP ratio corrected by the evolution of the stock market index during 
the 4th quarter (highest minus lowest values). For 1982-1985 the share was 
set at the same level of 1986. 
 
Real Estate Wealth: The consistency between valuation rules in the tax code 
and the data available posed several methodological problems to estimate 
this fraction of wealth. Between 1978 and 1992, urban real estate was mainly 
priced at cadastral values. Rural estate valuation formula required capitalizing 
at 4% the amount fixed in the local estate tax. Since 1992, real estate, both 
urban and rural, must be valued at the highest of (a) the property registry 
value, (b) the purchasing price, (c) the value determined for other local taxes. 
Local real estate taxes are based on cadastral values, computed following an 
established formula with price-coefficients defined for land surface, 
construction type, urban zone, etc, and which can be updated periodically by 
local authorities. Nevertheless, cadastral values are generally less than 50% 
of market prices. This can be easily verified comparing the Bank of Spain 
statistics (based on market prices, source (c)) with the property registry 
statistics (source (d)). For instance, between 1990 and 2002 the ratio between 
both series ranged from 30% to 45%. This implies a gap difficult to correct 
between the numerator and the denominator. For this reason, we also studied 
separately the distribution of financial wealth (net of real estate) in the main 
text. 
Real estate net wealth is the result of deducting mortgage loans from 
household real estate wealth.  The former is taken from Banco de España, 
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Indicadores del Mercado de la Vivienda (source (c)). Data correspond to the 
4th quarter and cover years 1987 to 2004. These estimates are constructed 
upon the series of residential units, average surface and average market 
prices. On the liability side, mortgage debts are approximated by long run 
debts from Cuentas Financieras de la Economía Española (source (a)). For 
the years 1982-1986 we fixed the real estate wealth/GDP ratio at the 1987 
level. 
Wealth tax information excludes Navarra and Pais Vasco. To take this 
fact into account, we corrected total wealth as follows.  We assumed that total 
wealth in those regions was roughly proportional to real estate wealth.  The 
share of Navarra and Pais Vasco real estate wealth in Spain is taken from 
Caixa de Catalunya (2004) (source (e)), based on Ministerio de Fomento. 
The numerator, that is, the real estate declared in the wealth tax files, 
was also adjusted to reflect market prices. The correction factor is the ratio 
between the market-priced wealth (source (c)) and the GDP from 1987 to 
2002. Between 1982 and 1986 the factor was set to the 1987 value. This 
decision was based on the fact that the ratio [real estate wealth from source 
(c)/ real estate wealth from property registry statistics source (d)] displays a 
very similar pattern but is available for a shorter period. 
 
C.2 Total number of individuals 
 
For the period 1933-1971, total number of individuals is computed as the 
number of individuals in the Spanish population aged 20 and above; this 
excludes Navarra and Alava since 1937 and 1943 respectively. These series 
are based on Census interpolations provided by INE and reported in Table 
B3, column 1. Column 2 also indicates the total number of tax returns (with 
positive taxable income) actually filed as well as the fraction of adult 
population filling a tax return (Column 3). 
For the period 1982-2002, total individuals correspond to the number of 
adults aged 20 and over excluding País Vasco and Navarra. Again this series 
come from Census interpolations and are reported in Table A1, Column 1. 
The census data have been taken from Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, 
Dirección General del Instituto Geográfico Catastral, Censo de la Población 
de España 1930; Ministerio de Trabajo, Dirección General de Estadística, 
Censo de la Población de España 1940; Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística, Censo de la Población de España 1950; Censo de la 
Población y las Viviendas de España 1960; Censo de la Población de España 
1970; Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Censo de Población y Viviendas 
1980, 1991, 2001. 
 
C.3 Total Income Denominator  
 
For the period 1981-2002 total income is defined as wages and salaries from 
National Accounts net of social contributions plus 50% of social transfers, plus 
66.6% of unincorporated business income (excluding Navarra and Pais 
Vasco), plus all non-business, non labor income reported on tax returns.  The 
total denominator series expressed in 2000 Euros is reported in Column 4 of 
Table A1. The average income per adult is reported in Column 7 while the 
CPI index (base 100 in year 2000) is reported in Column 6.  
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For the period 1933-1971, we use as denominator 66% of the Spanish 
GDP from Prados de la Escosura (2003). The number 66% is chosen to be 
consistent with our denominator for the recent period, which fluctuates 
between 63% and 69% of Spanish GDP (excluding Pais Vasco and Navarra). 
Our denominator for the 1933-1971 period is reported in Table B3. The first 
official consumer price index dates back to 1940. Table B3, Column 4 
displays the income series converted in 2000 Euros. 
 
 
D. Estimating Top Shares 
 
D.1. Basic Pareto Interpolation 
 
The general interpolation technique is based on the well known empirical 
regularity that the top tail of the income distribution is very closely 
approximated by a Pareto distribution. A Pareto distribution has a cumulative 
distribution function of the form F(y)=1-(k/y)a where k and a are constants, 
and a is the Pareto parameter of the distribution. Such a distribution has the 
key property that the average income above a given threshold y is always 
exactly proportional to y. The coefficient of proportionality is equal to b=a/(a-
1). 
The first step consists then in estimating the income thresholds 
corresponding to each of the percentiles P90, P95, P99, …, P99.99, that 
define our top income groups. For each percentile p, we look first for the 
published income bracket [s,t] containing the percentile p. We estimate then 
the parameters a and k of the Pareto distribution by solving the two equations:  
k=s p(1/a) and k=t q(1/a) where p is the fraction of tax returns above s and q the 
fraction of tax returns above t.48 Note that the Pareto parameters k and a may 
vary from bracket to bracket. Once the density distribution on [s,t] is 
estimated, it is straightforward to estimate the income threshold, say yp, 
corresponding to percentile p. 
 The second step consists of estimating the amounts of income 
reported above income threshold yp. We estimate the amount reported 
between income yp and t (the upper bound of the published bracket [s,t] 
containing yp) using the estimated Pareto density with parameters a and k. 
We then add to that amount the amounts in all the published brackets above t.  
 Once the total amount above yp is obtained, we obtain directly the 
mean income above percentile p by dividing the amount by the number of 
individuals above percentile p. Finally, the share of income accruing to 
individuals above percentile p is obtained by dividing the total amount above 
yp by our income denominator series (Table A1, col. (4)). Average incomes 
and income shares for intermediate fractiles (P90-95, P95-99, etc.) are 
obtained by subtraction. 
 
D.2. Adjustments to raw Pareto Interpolations 
 
Period 1933-1971 
                                                
48 This is the standard method of Pareto interpolation used by Kuznets (1953) and Feenberg 
and Poterba (1993). 
 39 
 
For the period 1933-1971 we adopt the following adjustments to the statistics.  
In 1935 and 1940, the statistics also report tax filers from previous 
years, who have been subject to an audit and a subsequent increase in 
reported income. Those audited tax filers are placed in the bracket where they 
belonged in the previous year but only the additional income uncovered by 
the audit is reported. As a result of those audited tax filers, the number of 
filers in each bracket is too high relative to income reported. In order to 
remove those audit taxpayers, we discard the information on the number of 
tax filers per bracket and we use only the total income per bracket. We 
recover the number of tax filers by assuming that average income per current 
year taxpayer in 1935 and 1940 is the same as in 1934. Our estimates are 
slightly over-estimated due to the additional income due to audits. However, 
additional income due to audits is probably small relative to regular reported 
income. Furthermore, income including audits is a closer approximation to 
real incomes than income before audits (although for 1935 and 1940, the 
additional income from audits corresponds to an earlier year). 
 For 1941, about 14% of tax returns were reported separately and only 
in the aggregate. As the average income for those 14% returns is extremely 
close to the average for remaining returns, we assume that those 14% returns 
are distributed by brackets in the same way as the rest of returns. The same 
issue arises for 1957, 1958, 1961 where a significant fraction of returns were 
not processed in time for the regular publication and are only reported in 
aggregate in the subsequent publication year. In each case, we assume that 
those late returns are distributed as the regular returns. Because the average 
income of late returns is close to the average for regular returns, this seems 
an acceptable assumption. 
 From 1942, a deduction for dependent children was introduced and the 
tax returns are presented by size of income net of this dependent children 
exemption. The deduction is 3,000 Pesetas for each child from 1942 to 1953, 
10,000 Pesetas from 1954 to 1960, and 25,000 Pesetas in 1961. We add 
back those deductions to our income estimates in order to estimates shares 
based on income before those deductions. In most years, those deductions 
are reported by brackets. When they are only reported in aggregate, we 
impute the deductions in each bracket using years when this information is 
provided. The average number of children is fairly stable overtime and across 
brackets so this approximation is acceptable. 
 Two important additional deductions are introduced in 1954. The first 
deduction is deductions for extraordinary expenses and charitable 
contributions. The law allowed for deductible expenses without bounds, which 
were declared at the discretion of the taxpayers: wedding expenses, 
pharmacy purchases, transfers to family members in state of necessity (where 
the term necessity was fuzzily defined). Individuals could also make donations 
without limits (many of which were suspected of being de facto self-donations 
for high income earners, when the individual himself managed the foundation, 
created with the sole purpose of attracting donations). The second deduction 
is a deduction for employment income equal to 33% of labor income up to a 
maximum deduction of 100,000 Pesetas. Those two deductions are reported 
by brackets for years 1958, 1959, and 1961, and are about 5% of reported 
incomes each within the top 0.1%. We assume that the level of deductions is 
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the same as in 1958 in years 1954-1957 when the information on deductions 
is not reported separately. 
 The 1971 tax statistics are reported by size of gross income equal to 
the sum of each component (capital income, business income, labor income, 
etc.) before the extraordinary deductions and the deductions for dependent 
children. However, the deduction for labor income has been netted out of the 
labor income component. Because there is no information of labor income by 
brackets, we assume that the fraction of labor income within the top 0.1% is 
20% (which was the corresponding number in 1961, the closest year where 
this information is available). The labor income deduction is also about 5% of 
total income in the top 0.1% in 1971. 
 
Period 1981-2004 
 
1. Exclusions from the income tax 
 
Statistics are presented by brackets of income net of the labor income 
deduction and the pension deduction. The amount of those deductions is 
reported for each bracket in the tax statistics. Therefore, for each fractile, we 
compute the average amount of deductions and add those amounts to the 
raw estimates. 
 
2. Series excluding capital gains 
 
Second, since 1981, capital gains are included in taxable income (see 
appendix section B above). For series excluding capital gains, we need to 
subtract the capital gains component from the raw series. The amount of 
capital gains is also reported by brackets in the tax statistics. In order to 
compute our series from the raw series, one could simply deduct for each 
group the share of capital gains estimated from composition tables. The 
problem is that ranking according to the income including capital gains and 
ranking according to income excluding capital gains might be different, 
especially at the very top. For example, in the extreme case where very top 
incomes of the income tax statistics distributions consist only of capital gains, 
then the deduction of capital gains would lead to the conclusion that the very 
top incomes of the income (excluding capital gains) distribution are equal to 
zero. Therefore, deducting the full amount of capital gains would provide an 
underestimate of the income shares we would like to estimate. In order to 
correct for this re-ranking bias, we therefore need to subtract less than 100% 
of capital gains.  
Based on other studies such as Piketty and Saez (2003) for the United 
States and Saez and Veall (2005) for Canada, where not only similar 
tabulated tax statistics but also micro data are available, a good 
approximation is to subtract 80% of capital gains amounts instead of 100% to 
obtain shares of income excluding capital gains. This is therefore the rule we 
follow in the case of Spain. Using the 2002 large sample of micro-tax returns, 
we have verified that this rule gives very accurate results: the estimates based 
on micro-data excluding capital gains for 2002 are extremely close to the 
results we obtain from the tabulated statistics published by the tax 
administration. 
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3. Shift from family to individual taxation in 1988 
 
Before 1988, taxation was based on the family unit (as in the United States 
today). Starting in 1989, individual taxation became possible and is actually 
an advantageous option when the secondary earner has positive income. As 
we have discussed above, our top groups are defined relative to the total 
adult population and our series measure individual income concentration. For 
the period 1988 to 2002, income tax statistics measure individual incomes as 
married couples where both spouses have positive incomes have an incentive 
to file separately in order to reduce their tax burden.  
Before 1988, however, income tax statistics measure family income as 
the income of spouses are aggregated for income tax purposes. Therefore, 
our basic methodology overstates income concentration  (as spousal income 
is added to the income of top earners). Indeed, uncorrected series display a 
clearly visible discontinuity from 1987 to 1988. We use the micro tax panel 
data to make the correction for the 1981-1987 period. Using the micro data for 
1988, we can compute top income shares at the household level and at the 
individual level (as the micro data allows to reconstitute families). We can then 
compute adjustment factors as the ratio of the individual shares to the 
household shares. We then apply those factors to all years from 1981 to 1987 
to obtain corrected estimates. This correction reduces raw income shares by 
about 10%. 
 
Top Wealth Shares Estimation 
 
Top wealth shares for the period 1982-2002 are also estimated using the 
same Pareto interpolation technique. We do not make a correction for 
individual versus family filing because the wealth tax has always been 
assessed at the individual level (except for married couples with joint tenancy) 
and, in contrast to income share series, there are no discontinuity in the series 
from 1987 to 1988. 
 As in the case of the income tax, we add back exempted items such as 
exempted businesses (after the 1994 reform) or the standard exemption for 
the main residence (after 2000), which are fortunately reported by wealth 
brackets in the published statistics. 
 We estimate two top wealth shares series : series excluding real estate 
and series included market priced real estate. For series excluding real 
estates, we subtract the real estate (including the real estate exemption after 
2000) from our raw estimates. For series including real estates, we inflate the 
value of real estate by a uniform multiplicative factor equal to total real estate 
from the Flow of Funds accounts divided by total cadastral value reported in 
aggregate real estate statistics, and we add back to our raw series the 
difference between the market price series and the cadastral value. 
 
Estimation of wealth and income composition series 
 
We have constructed income and wealth composition series for each of our 
top groups for the period 1981-2002 using tax statistics showing the 
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breakdown of income and wealth into various components by income and 
wealth brackets.  
The income composition series reported in Table C indicate for each 
upper income group the fraction of total income (including capital gains) that 
comes from the various types of income. We consider 4 types of income: 
wage income; entrepreneurial income; capital income (excluding capital 
gains); and realized capital gains. Wage income includes wages and salaries 
(including the wage income deduction), as well as pensions. Entrepreneurial 
income includes self-employment income from professions such as doctors, 
lawyers, etc. Business income also includes income from sole proprietorships, 
partnership income, and farm income. Capital income includes dividends, 
interest income, rents, and other investment income. Capital gains include 
both long-term and short-term capital gains reported on tax returns. We have 
excluded from these composition series the other income category which 
never make more than 5% of the total income as this simplifies the reading of 
our composition series (the other income category was taken into account 
when computing top income levels and top income shares in total income).  
The wealth composition series reported in Table E2 indicate for each 
upper wealth group the fraction of total wealth (including the market value of 
real estate) that comes from the various types of assets. We consider six 
types of assets: real estate, business assets, fixed claim assets, stocks, other 
assets, and debts. Real estate includes the market value of real estate. It is 
estimated as reported real estate amount (including the deduction for primary 
residence since 2000) times the ratio of total market value of real estate in 
Spain divided by total cadastral value of real estate in Spain. Business assets 
include the value of unincorporated business assets. Fixed claim assets 
include cash, checking and savings accounts, annualized wealth, life 
insurance, public and corporate bonds. Stocks include publicly traded and 
closely held corporate stock either directly owned or owned through 
investment funds. Other includes household goods, jewels, vehicles, 
intellectual property rights, non-exempted works of arts and other assets. 
Debts include mortgage debts, consumer debts, and business debts. 
The composition series are estimated from the published tables in 
indicating for each income (or wealth) bracket not only the number of 
taxpayers and the total amount of their total income (or wealth) but also the 
separate amounts for each type of income (or wealth), as well as the 
deductions. The composition of income (or wealth) within each group was 
estimated from these tables using a simple linear interpolation method. Such 
a method is less satisfactory than the Pareto interpolation method used to 
estimate top income levels (no obvious law seems to fit composition patterns 
in a stable way). See Piketty and Saez (2007) for a more precise discussion 
of this method where it is systematically compared with direct estimates using 
micro data. 
 
D.3. Estimating Top Shares from individual Income Tax Panel 
 
We also computed top shares with and without capital gains (Tables B5 and 
B6) using the microdata from the panel of income tax returns 1982-1998 
(Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Panel IRPF-AEAT) and the 2002 sample of 
income tax files (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Muestra de Declarantes de 
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IRPF 2002). The panel is composed of approximately 2% of total returns (the 
number of observations ranges from 123,599 in 1982 to 308,558 in 1998), 
while the 2002 sample has information for 907,399 out of 15,481,382 files and 
oversamples high incomes. The definition of individual income follows the 
same rules as in the tabulated data case. Total reference income and 
population is also the same. 
As it was described above, before 1988 data available only identifies 
family income as the income of spouses is aggregated in the tax file due to 
mandatory joint filing.  We used the micro tax panel for 1988 to adjust for this. 
For 2002, the results from the sample are very close to the results from 
the tax tabulations. The 2002 sample perfectly matches aggregates. On the 
other side, the panel shares display an overall similar pattern when compared 
to shares based on grouped data, but differences are somewhat larger. This 
is mainly due to sample size issues and sampling strategy problems in the 
panel. 
 
 
E. Computing Marginal Tax Rates 
 
Marginal tax rates displayed in Table B4 were computed using the panel of 
individual income tax returns 1982-1998 and the 2002 sample of income tax 
files. For each individual we computed the taxable income following the tax 
code, as the sum of taxable sources excluding elements taxed by average or 
flat rates and not subject to the progressive tax scale (capital gains, irregular 
income and income adjustments from previous years). Then we applied the 
tax scale to identify the marginal rate that affects each individual. 
We also computed total gross income as the sum of taxable sources, 
capital gains and irregular income (but excluding adjustments from previous 
years) plus labor income deductions. We ranked individuals by gross income 
(as done for our estimates based on grouped data) and computed the 
average marginal tax rates for top percentiles weighted by gross income. This 
procedure explains the fact that in some cases the marginal tax rate is lower 
for the top 0.01% than for the top 0.1%. The reason is the following: consider 
two individuals in the top 0.01%; the first one has no capital gains and no 
irregular income; consequently she is affected by the maximum marginal rate; 
the second individual only has capital gains; therefore she is affected by a 
zero marginal rate according to the progressive tax scale, while she still 
belongs to the top group. As the proportion of capital gains in total income 
increases with income (see Table C), it is then possible to find more people at 
the top subject to relatively smaller marginal rates.  
 
F. Estimating Net Worth Shares and Composition from the Wealth 
Survey 
 
In 2002 the Bank of Spain conducted a household wealth survey whose 
preliminary results are presented in Bover (2004). We compare our results 
based on the tax statistics with the survey microdata (Table E3).  
To be consistent with our tax estimates we defined net financial wealth 
as the sum of: checking accounts, bank deposits, jewelry, antiques, artworks, 
life insurance, mutual funds, fixed income securities, business assets, and 
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other household claims net of debts different from mortgage debts. Total net 
wealth is net financial wealth as described plus the declared price for the main 
residence plus other real estate minus mortgage debts. We do not consider 
pension funds, which are not taxed. 
As the survey data are based on household information while our 
results refer to the individual distribution, we compute the top shares under 
two extreme scenarios. In the first one, we assume that all wealth belongs to 
the head of the household (panels C and D in Table E3). For the second 
scenario, we assume that every spouse owns 50% of the household wealth 
(panels E and F in Table E3). The reference total for the population is the 
number of adults aged 20 and over in all Spain, this time including País Vasco 
and Navarra.  
 
G. Previous Work on Inequality in Spain 
 
Until the beginning of the decade of 1970 the studies on inequality and 
income distribution in Spain are very scarce, due mainly to the lack of data. 
The Instituto de Estudios Agrosociales, 1958 ran a study on the distribution of 
expenditure in 1956, as an assignment for the FAO, while the Spanish 
statistics bureau (INE) conducted a households’ consumption survey in 1958 
(Infomación Comercial Española, 1962). 
The first households’ budget surveys (Encuesta de Presupuestos 
Familiares, EPF) were carried out in 1964/1965, 1966/1967, 1969/1970, 
1973/1974 and 1980/1981. The results were somewhat deficient, and many 
ad-hoc assumptions were made for consistency with the national accounts, 
including corrections for under-reporting by income size and income source, 
as well as adjustments to a Pareto distribution. In fact, the ability of these 
surveys to approximate a comparable total personal income from National 
Accounts was extremely limited.49 They generated the first distribution series 
to be comparable in time (Alcaide Inchausti 1967, 1974; Alcaide and Alcaide 
1974, 1977, 1983). According to their estimates, the top 10% received 36.8%, 
41.3%, 40.7%, 39.5% and 29.2% of income respectively, stressing a 
decrease in inequality levels from 1973/1974 to 1980/1981.50 
In 1963 the INE launched the publication Salarios, based on an annual 
employer survey, referred to workers legally related to any firm employing at 
least 10 individuals. The survey covered most of the industrial sector, 
construction and some services, but excluded the agricultural sector, non-
road transportation, leisure and civil service. Respondents were about 2,400 
establishments that reported on the number of workers and their average 
salary by wage intervals. The survey had important methodological revisions 
in 1976 and 1981. Albi, 1975 computed Gini coefficients from this wage 
survey between 1963 and 1972, finding an increasing trend in earnings 
                                                
49 The differences between National Accounts and household surveys regarding income 
measurement have been analyzed in Deaton, 2005 and the Canberra Expert Group on 
Household Income Statistics (2001). 
50 As an example, the magnitude of the corrections applied by these studies can be seen from 
the fact that, according to the 1980/1981 survey, the top 10% received 25.4% of income 
before any correction was made. 
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inequality; Cordero et al., 1988 compared the 1982 and 1986 wage surveys 
and also found a growing level of wage concentration.51 
Between 1964 and 1980, the INE published an annual report on 
national income and distribution (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1965-1970 
and 1971-1980), but the information was extremely limited and focused not on 
the personal but on the functional distribution of aggregate income from 
National Accounts; it also included a summary of the main results from the 
wage survey mentioned above. 
Based on the 1980/1981 households’ budget survey, Ruiz-Castillo 
(1987) studied inequality using the information about expenditure and not 
income. Bosch et al., 1989 applied the same methodology to compare the 
1973/1974 and 1980/1981 surveys. A new comparison between the 
1973/1974 and 1980/1981 surveys pertains to Ruiz-Castillo, 1998. Ruiz-
Castillo and Sastre, 1999 added the comparison with the 1990/1991 survey. 
The authors find a considerable drop in inequality between 1973/1974 and 
1980/1981; given the increase of per capita expenditure, they conclude that a 
rise in welfare took place. For the decade of 1980 they observe an increase in 
the average expenditure but a stop in the pattern of reduction in inequality 
which took place during the previous decade. These studies have been 
extended in Del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo, 2001a,b. Gradín, 2000, 2002 has used 
the EPFs to analyze polarization and inequality from 1973 to 1991.52 
Notwithstanding the different levels reported in inequality indexes and 
the different variable analyzed (income, expenditure), the studies based on 
households’ surveys show a decrease in inequality during the 1970s.  
Research has also been done on the basis of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). See, for example, Pascual and 
Sarabia, 2004 for an analysis of the period 1993-2000 (they find a drop in 
inequality in 1993-1994, a sustained increase in 1994-1996, and a new 
decrease in 1997-2000; overall inequality measured by the Gini coefficient 
seems to display a small overall reduction), and Ayala and Sastre, 2005 for 
mobility issues between 1994 and 1998. Budría and Díaz-Giménez, 2006 
analyze in detail the 1998 ECHP wave, as well as income mobility between 
1994 and 1998. 
Starting in 1985, the INE developed a continuous households’ survey. 
Oliver et al., 2001 has used this source between 1985-1996 and documents 
an improvement in income distribution for the whole period according to 
several indicators; nevertheless, the reported Gini coefficient for 1996 is 
statistically equal to that of 1987.  
More recently, researchers have used income tax data to assess 
inequality, providing a different picture when compared to results from 
households’ surveys. Castañer, 1991 and Lasheras et al., 1993 analyze the 
redistributive power of the income tax; the authors show that several 
inequality indicators grew steadily between 1982 and 1990. Ayala and 
Onrubia, 2001 use the income tax panel between 1982 and 1994 and income 
tax tabulations between 1995 and 1998 to compute Gini indexes. They do not 
consider capital gains. They observe an increasing inequality trend between 
1982 and 1991, followed by a relative stability until 1994, and a new 
                                                
51 See Cordero et al., 1988 for an account of the limitations of the wage survey since 1981. 
52 Other studies include Medel et al., 1988, Escribano, 1990, Ayala et al., 1993, Alvarez et al., 
1996. 
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increasing trend after 1995, which the authors attribute to a growing inequality 
in the wage distribution. Rodríguez and Salas, 2006 use the income tax panel 
to analyze the redistributive consequences of the income tax reforms between 
1982 and 1995. 
Finally, both survey and tax sources have been used to study tax 
reforms, as in Díaz and Sebastián, 2004 and González-Torrabadella and 
Pijoan-Mas, 2006, among others. 
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Notes: Computations based on income tax return statistics and National Accounts. 
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and before individual income taxes but net of all social contributions (employer and employee)
Amounts are expressed in current 2004 Euros. 
Column (2) reports the income thresholds corresponding to each of the percentiles in column (1). For example,
an annual income of at least 31,599 Euros is required to belong to the top 10% tax units, etc.
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FIGURE 1.
Average Real Income and Consumer Price Index in Spain, 1930-2004
Source: Table A1.
Figure reports the average real income per adult (aged 20 and above), expressed in real 2004 Euros.
CPI index is equal to 100 in 2004.
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FIGURE 2
The Top 0.01% Income Share in Spain, 1933-2004
Source: 1933-1971 from Table B3 (column top 0.01%), 1981-2004 from Table B2 (column top 0.01%).
For 1933 to 1971, estimations based on the old income tax statistics.
For 1981 to 2004, estimations based on income excluding realized capital gains (for homogeneity
with older income tax).
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FIGURE 3
The Top 0.01% Income Share in Spain, US and France, 1933-2004
Sources: US: Piketty and Saez (2003); France: Piketty (2001) and Landais (2007);
Spain: 1933-1971 from Table B3 (column top 0.01%), 1981-2004 from Table B2 (column top 0.01%).
Top 0.01% income share excludes realized capital gains.
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FIGURE 4
The Top 10-5%, Top 5-1%, and Top 1% Income Share in Spain, 1981-2004
Source: Table B1, columns top 10-5%, top 5-1%, and top 1%.
Income includes realized capital gains
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FIGURE 5
The Top 1-0.5%, Top 0.5-0.1%, and Top 0.1% Income Share in Spain, 1981-2004
Source: Table B1, columns top 1-0.5%, top 0.5-0.1%, and top 0.1%.
Income includes realized capital gains
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FIGURE 6
The Top 0.1% Income Share and Composition in Spain, 1981-2004
Source: Table B1, top 0.1% income share and Table C, composition columns for top 0.1%.
The figure displays the income share of the top 0.1% tax units, and how the top 0.1% incomes are  
divided into four income components: wages and salaries (including pensions), 
business and professional income, capital income (interest, dividends, and rents), and realized capital gains.
For example, in 1981, the top 0.1% was 1.95% of total income. Of those 1.95%, 0.55% were
from wage income, 0.6% from business income, 0.7% from capital income, and 0.1% from capital gains.
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
To
p 
0.
1%
 in
co
m
e 
sh
ar
e 
an
d 
co
m
po
si
tio
n
Wages Business Capital Inc. K gains
FIGURE 7
Madrid Stock-Market Index and Capital Gains at the Top, 1981-2004
Source: Madrid Stock Market Index from Globalfinance data.
For each year, the mean of the low and high is reported.
Capital gains at the top 1% is the real amount of capital gains reported by the top 1% income earners
The vertical axis measures the logarithm of the Madrid Stock Market Index and the logarithm of
the top 1% capital gains.
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FIGURE 8
Top Wage Income Shares in Spain, 1982-2002
Source: Table D, columns Top 10-5%, Top 5-1%, Top 1%.
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FIGURE 9
Average Net Worth and Composition, 1982-2004
Source: Table A2.
Net real estate is defined as total household real estate wealth net of mortgage debt
Fixed claim assets are cash, deposits, and bonds.
Stocks include publicly traded and closely held stock, directly or indirectly held.
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FIGURE 11
Top 1% Wealth Share in Spain, 1982-2004
Source: Table E1, column top 1%.
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FIGURE 12
Top Wealth Shares (including real estate) in Spain, 1982-2004
Source: Table E1
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FIGURE 13
The Top 0.1% wealth Share and Composition in Spain, 1982-2004
Source: Table E1 and E2, columns top 0.1%.
The figure displays the wealth share of the top 1% tax units, and how the top 1% wealth holdings are  
divided into 4 components: real estate, business assets, fixed claim assets (cash, deposits, bonds),
and stocks (publicly traded or closely held).
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FIGURE 14
The Top 0.01% Financial Wealth Share and Composition in Spain, 1982-2002
Source: Table E1 and E2, and direct computations based on wealth tax statistics.
The figure displays the financial wealth share and composition of the top 0.01% tax units.
Stocks are broken down into three components: publicly traded stocks, taxable closely held stocks,
and exempted closely held stocks.
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Top 1% Top .5% Top .1% Top .01% Top 1-.5% Top .5-.1% Top .1-.01% Top .01%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Top Wealth Shares Including Real Estate
1982 19.81 15.50 7.83 2.58 4.31 7.66 5.25 2.58
1983 19.41 15.08 7.74 2.68 4.33 7.35 5.05 2.68
1984 18.85 14.61 7.40 2.46 4.24 7.20 4.94 2.46
1985 19.11 14.64 7.27 2.37 4.46 7.37 4.90 2.37
1986 19.52 14.92 7.43 2.55 4.60 7.49 4.88 2.55
1987 19.04 14.44 7.03 2.31 4.60 7.41 4.72 2.31
1988 17.28 12.98 6.36 2.04 4.30 6.62 4.32 2.04
1989 16.88 12.62 6.04 1.92 4.26 6.58 4.11 1.92
1990 16.82 12.38 5.79 1.78 4.44 6.60 4.01 1.78
1991 16.12 11.73 5.39 1.59 4.39 6.34 3.79 1.59
1992 16.02 11.63 5.32 1.60 4.39 6.32 3.72 1.60
1993 16.62 11.84 5.46 1.66 4.78 6.38 3.80 1.66
1994 16.33 11.50 5.18 1.53 4.83 6.32 3.66 1.53
1995 15.93 11.20 5.00 1.47 4.73 6.20 3.52 1.47
1996 16.62 11.75 5.25 1.56 4.88 6.50 3.69 1.56
1997 17.39 12.17 5.39 1.59 5.23 6.78 3.81 1.59
1998 17.22 12.03 5.36 1.61 5.19 6.67 3.74 1.61
1999 17.17 12.26 5.31 1.58 4.92 6.95 3.73 1.58
2000 17.30 12.42 5.39 1.58 4.88 7.03 3.81 1.58
2001 17.16 12.28 5.32 1.60 4.88 6.95 3.72 1.60
2002 18.27 13.10 5.60 1.57 5.18 7.49 4.03 1.57
2003 17.59 12.38 5.17 1.44 5.21 7.22 3.73 1.44
2004 17.61 12.37 5.17 1.44 5.24 7.21 3.73 1.44
B. Top Financial Wealth Shares (excluding real estate)
1982 24.85 21.36 13.16 5.46 3.49 8.20 7.70 5.46
1983 25.22 21.36 13.34 5.99 3.87 8.02 7.35 5.99
1984 23.40 19.72 12.20 5.32 3.68 7.51 6.89 5.32
1985 23.73 19.75 11.97 5.09 3.98 7.78 6.88 5.09
1986 25.41 21.06 12.82 5.61 4.35 8.24 7.21 5.61
1987 24.77 20.47 12.48 5.32 4.30 7.99 7.16 5.32
1988 24.68 20.06 11.64 4.93 4.62 8.43 6.71 4.93
1989 24.76 20.24 11.66 5.01 4.52 8.58 6.64 5.01
1990 25.78 20.92 11.77 4.91 4.86 9.15 6.85 4.91
1991 24.74 19.98 11.09 4.54 4.76 8.89 6.55 4.54
1992 23.35 18.72 10.19 4.15 4.64 8.53 6.04 4.15
1993 23.25 18.18 9.97 4.05 5.07 8.21 5.92 4.05
1994 22.08 17.03 9.02 3.52 5.06 8.01 5.50 3.52
1995 20.77 15.85 8.37 3.25 4.92 7.48 5.12 3.25
1996 21.28 16.16 8.59 3.32 5.12 7.57 5.28 3.32
1997 21.94 16.32 8.63 3.20 5.62 7.69 5.42 3.20
1998 21.17 15.64 8.39 3.15 5.53 7.25 5.24 3.15
1999 22.04 17.27 9.07 3.41 4.78 8.20 5.66 3.41
2000 24.34 19.06 10.02 3.74 5.28 9.03 6.29 3.74
2001 24.79 19.44 10.36 4.04 5.35 9.08 6.32 4.04
2002 26.19 20.58 10.90 4.13 5.61 9.68 6.77 4.13
2003 25.13 19.77 10.43 3.98 5.36 9.34 6.45 3.98
2004 25.61 20.21 10.76 4.22 5.40 9.44 6.55 4.22
Notes: Computations by authors on wealth tax return statistics. 
See details in Appendix.
Table E1. Top Wealth Shares in Spain, 1982-2004
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Units
Adults Total Net Average Total Net Average top shares Real Estate Fixed Claim Stocks Business Other Debts
Financial Wealth Wealth Assets
(millions 2000 (2000 Euros) (millions 2000 (2000 Euros) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
('000s) Euros) Euros)
Total from tax stats. 30.249 811.933 26.842 3.022.332 99.915
Total from survey 32.339 387.417 11.980 1.977.929 61.163 88,07 6,60 5,39 8,52 0,96 -9,55
A. Including real estate. Individual distribution from tax returns
top 1% 302 552.180 1.825.449 18,27 61,48 8,52 28,25 1,31 2,17 -1,72
top 0.5% 151 395.774 2.616.777 13,10 57,79 7,90 32,37 1,26 2,43 -1,74
top 0.1% 30 169.311 5.597.244 5,60 47,74 7,18 42,87 1,07 2,99 -1,84
top 1-0.5% 156.406 5,18
top 0.5-0.1% 226.463 7,49
top 0.1% 169.311 5,60
B. Excluding real estate. Individual distribution from tax returns
top 1% 302 197.592 653.218 24,34
top 0.5% 151 154.722 1.022.989 19,06
top 0.1% 30 81.372 2.690.070 10,02
top 1-0.5% 42.870 5,28
top 0.5-0.1% 73.350 9,03
top 0.1% 81.372 10,02
C. Including real estate. Individual distribution from the survey assuming that all wealth belongs to the head of household
top 10% 3.234 324.673 100.398 1.252.960 387.450 63,35 78,06 6,03 7,67 11,96 1,14 -4,86
top 5% 1.617 278.134 172.013 902.939 558.428 45,65 72,93 5,65 9,80 14,69 1,42 -4,49
top 1% 323 176.129 544.639 401.837 1.242.592 20,32 58,55 4,76 16,80 20,62 2,22 -2,94
top 0.5% 162 144.511 893.734 292.866 1.811.243 14,81 52,70 4,59 20,29 22,33 2,62 -2,53
top 0.1% 32 90.772 2.806.910 137.602 4.255.030 6,96 35,19 3,40 30,65 31,18 1,02 -1,44
top 10-5% 46.540 350.020 17,70
top 5-1% 102.005 501.102 25,33
top 1-0.5% 31.618 108.971 5,51
top 0.5-0.1% 53.739 155.264 7,85
top 0.1% 90.772 137.602 6,96
D. Excluding real estate. Individual distribution from the survey assuming that all wealth belongs to the head of household
top 10% 3.234 369.197 114.166 95,30
top 5% 1.617 323.762 200.232 83,57
top 1% 323 208.686 645.316 53,87
top 0.5% 162 165.658 1.024.520 42,76
top 0.1% 32 102.122 3.157.898 26,36
top 10-5% 45.436 11,73
top 5-1% 115.075 29,70
top 1-0.5% 43.029 11,11
top 0.5-0.1% 63.536 16,40
top 0.1% 102.122 26,36
E. Including real estate. Individual distribution based on the survey assuming that wealth is divided equally between spouses
top 10% 3.234 292.241 90.369 1.006.744 311.313 50,90 74,88 5,96 8,91 13,66 1,39 -4,79
top 5% 1.617 244.438 151.174 716.443 443.088 36,22 69,26 5,70 11,33 16,19 1,55 -4,03
top 1% 323 151.786 469.365 328.579 1.016.058 16,61 56,70 4,52 18,15 21,23 2,74 -3,35
top 0.5% 162 130.652 808.025 234.869 1.452.558 11,87 46,75 4,29 22,99 25,65 3,12 -2,80
top 0.1% 32 80.162 2.478.835 109.222 3.377.463 5,52 27,86 3,04 32,87 36,65 1,11 -1,53
top 10-5% 47.803 290.301 14,68
top 5-1% 92.651 387.864 19,61
top 1-0.5% 21.134 93.710 4,74
top 0.5-0.1% 50.490 125.646 6,35
top 0.1% 80.162 109.222 5,52
F. Excluding real estate. Individual distribution based on the survey assuming that wealth is divided equally between spouses
top 10% 3.234 339.119 104.865 87,53
top 5% 1.617 288.455 178.396 74,46
top 1% 323 178.137 550.848 45,98
top 0.5% 162 143.099 885.002 36,94
top 0.1% 32 86.684 2.680.503 22,37
top 10-5% 50.664 13,08
top 5-1% 110.318 28,48
top 1-0.5% 35.038 9,04
top 0.5-0.1% 56.415 14,56
top 0.1% 86.684 22,37
Source: Computations based on tax returns and Bank of Spain, Encuesta Financiera de las Familias 2002.
Notes: The  number of total adults for the tax-based statistics (30,249 million) is smaller than the
number of total adults for the survey-based statistics (32,339 million) because the former excludes País Vasco and Navarra.
Wealth CompositionTotal Financial Wealth Total Wealth
Table E3. Aggregate Net Worth and Composition, Households Wealth Survey 2002 vs. Tax Statistics
Tax Rate
from to (%)
100,001 120,000 1.00
120,001 150,000 1.43
150,001 200,000 2.00
200,001 250,000 2.78
250,001 300,000 3.42
300,001 400,000 3.97
400,001 500,000 4.86
500,001 750,000 5.57
750,001 1,000,000 6.84
If rent exceeds 1,000,000:
first 1,000,000 7.70
excess 11.00
80,001 100,000 1.00
100,001 120,000 1.50
120,001 150,000 1.93
150,001 200,000 2.50
200,001 250,000 3.28
250,001 300,000 3.92
300,001 400,000 4.47
400,001 500,000 5.36
500,001 750,000 6.07
750,001 1,000,000 7.34
If rent exceeds 1,000,000:
first 1,000,000 8.20
excess 11.00
70,001 100,000 7.50
100,001 250,000 18.00
250,001 500,000 25.00
500,001 1,000,000 30.00
over 1,000,000 40.00
60,001 100,000 7.50
100,001 150,000 18.00
150,001 250,000 20.00
250,001 500,000 27.00
500,001 1,000,000 33.00
over 1,000,000 44.00
100,001 125,000 2.50
125,001 150,000 2.90
150,001 175,000 3.85
175,001 200,000 4.60
200,001 250,000 5.90
250,001 300,000 7.55
300,001 400,000 10.05
400,001 500,000 13.35
500,001 600,000 16.65
600,001 700,000 20.00
700,001 800,000 23.30
800,001 900,000 26.65
900,001 1,000,000 29.85
over 1,000,000 33.00
100,001 125,000 2.50
125,001 175,000 3.85
175,001 200,000 4.60
200,001 250,000 5.90
250,001 300,000 7.55
300,001 400,000 10.05
400,001 500,000 13.35
500,001 600,000 16.65
600,001 700,000 20.00
700,001 800,000 23.30
800,001 900,000 26.65
900,001 1,000,000 29.85
1,000,001 2,000,000 33.00
2,000,001 3,000,000 35.65
3,000,001 4,000,000 37.75
4,000,001 5,000,000 39.30
5,000,001 6,000,000 42.00
over 6,000,000 44.00
0 100,000 15.00
100,001 200,000 18.20
200,001 300,000 26.60
300,001 400,000 23.00
400,001 500,000 25.40
500,001 600,000 27.80
600,001 700,000 30.50
700,001 800,000 33.40
800,001 900,000 36.30
900,001 1,000,000 39.20
1,000,001 1,100,000 42.10
1,100,001 1,300,000 47.20
1,300,001 1,600,000 56.10
over 1,600,000 61.40
TABLE F1. Income Tax Rates 1933-1973
Income level (pesetas)
1933-1935
1966-1973
1936-1940
1941
1942-1953
1957-1965
1954-1956
# Tax returns # Tax returns # Inspected
with positive taxable income Files
(1) (2) (3)
1933 1,446 1,446
1934 1,792 1,792
1935 2,880 2,880
1936 3,507 3,507
1937 1,542 1,542
1938 1,978 1,978
1939 2,289 2,289
1940 3,840 3,840
1941 4,495 4,495
1942 5,123 5,123
1943 5,538 5,538
1944 12,312 5,849 1,147
1945 11,817 6,629 1,140
1946 13,189 8,223 2,096
1947 17,897 7,983 1,964
1948 16,649 9,067 2,933
1949 19,755 10,111 3,294
1950 22,930 12,419 3,403
1951 23,887 13,597 3,524
1952 26,373 15,427 2,772
1953 27,653 16,545 1,118
1954 89,460 21,332 2,638
1955 98,604 26,716 1,915
1956 109,026 1,074
1957 119,618 38,493 1,306
1958 175,172 35,581 1,794
1959 190,791 42,246
1960 197,842
1961 222,593 26,623
1962 240,179
1963 296,701 3,183
1964 323,223 3,231
1965 347,434 2,947
1966 2,536
1967 4,612
1968 199,592 5,777 6,595
1969 228,132 13,709 8,979
1970 263,181 20,072 7,813
1971 338,989 22,556 4,045
1972 350,761 29,329
1973 498,663 36,663
1974 1,318,313 28,236
Sources: Income tax statistics published by the fiscal administration for years 1933 to 1971;
Gota Losada (1966); Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (1973); Martí Basterrechea (1974).
Table F2. Total Number of Tax Returns and Inspections: 1933-1974
# Tax Returns # Inspected Files # Tax Returns # Inspected Files
('000s) ('000s) ('000s) ('000s)
1986 7,896 34.90 781
1987 8,028 33.75 887 9.34
1988 8,954 25.04 756 6.97
1989 9,845 16.45 855 5.40
1990 10,965 28.05 974 9.58
1991 11,584 21.31 1,033 7.04
1992 12,341 33.39 863 9.61
1993 12,794 31.93 928 7.46
1994 13,578 25.77 809 4.89
1995 14,119 21.28 783 3.26
1996 14,620 18.97 825 2.23
1997 15,000 15.34 892 1.73
1998 15,424 10.06 946 1.21
1999 13,797 10.90 981 1.14
2000 14,123 9.67 869 1.07
2001 14,734 8.34 874 0.99
2002 15,410 8.25 884 0.92
Source: Agencia Tributaria, Memoria de Actividades
Income Tax Wealth Tax
Table F3. Number of Tax Inspections: 1986-2002
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Returns on 
real estate
Returns on 
financial 
assets
Business 
income 
(excluding 
farm) Farm income
Employment 
income Other
1941 Top 0.03% 19.92 35.81 26.43 4.43 12.54 0.87
1942 Top 0.03% 19.58 38.89 15.63 5.32 18.77 1.81
1943 Top 0.03% 19.96 37.79 10.95 6.88 21.77 2.66
1944 Top 0.04% 19.37 38.34 12.66 6.69 20.13 2.80
1945 Top 0.04% 19.34 36.60 12.87 7.51 19.21 4.47
1946 Top 0.05% 16.90 34.52 11.74 13.35 17.62 5.86
1947 Top 0.05% 17.96 32.14 12.14 13.42 19.04 5.30
1948 Top 0.05% 19.29 32.74 9.22 14.18 19.14 5.43
1949 Top 0.06% 19.45 32.94 8.08 13.44 19.90 6.18
1950 Top 0.07% 18.11 28.25 9.27 20.14 18.75 5.48
1951 Top 0.07% 17.34 28.26 9.18 20.48 19.29 5.45
1952 Top 0.08% 17.19 28.43 10.05 21.35 18.30 4.68
1953 Top 0.09% 17.43 28.88 9.20 20.24 18.41 5.84
1958 Top 0.05% 11.48 32.89 11.31 19.04 22.50 2.79
1959 Top 0.05% 11.65 33.26 9.51 18.71 24.10 2.76
1961 Top 0.05% 13.05 30.09 8.38 25.99 17.00 5.50
1981 Top 0.05% 5.00 34.70 34.30 0.40 25.60
Source: official income tax statistics. For years 1941-1953, the composition statistics are only available in aggregate. 
As a result, the size of the corresponding top group varies across those years.
For 1958, 1959, 1961 and 1981, the composition data are available by brackets and are reported in the Table for the top 0.05%.
Table H. Composition of Top Incomes under Old Income Tax
Top income group 
fractile
Composition
Author Title Year (if applicable)
A. Income and Wealth Numerator
Dirección General de Rentas Públicas Estadística de la Contribución General sobre la Renta 1933-1934
Dirección General de Contribución sobre la Renta Estadística de la Contribución sobre la Renta 1935-1940, 1941, 1942
Dirección General de Contribución sobre la Renta Estadística de Servicios 1943, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 
1947, 1948, 1949, 1950
Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de la Estadística de Servicios 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955
Contribución sobre la Renta
Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección General de Estadística de Servicios de la Contribución sobre la Renta 1956, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1962
Impuestos sobre la Renta
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (1973) Informe sobre el Sistema Tributario Español
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Hacienda Estadística
Pública Española 1974, (30), pp. 473-489
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Memoria de la Administración Tributaria 1982-1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987
Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
2000, 2001, 2002
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Memoria de la Administración Tributaria 2003, 2004, 2005
Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda y Presupuestos
Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria, Estadísticas IRPF y Patrimonio 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995
Departamento de Informática Tributaria 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000
Dirección General de Tributos, Subdirección General El Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas y 1999
de Política Tributaria el Impuesto sobre el Patrimonio en 1999
B. Income and Wealth Denominator
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Contabilidad Nacional de España Base 2000
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Contabilidad Nacional de España Base 1995
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Contabilidad Nacional de España Base 1986
Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, Dirección Censo de la Población de España 1930
General del Instituto Geográfico Catastral
Ministerio de Trabajo, Dirección General de Estadística Censo de la Población de España 1940
Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística Censo de la Población de España 1950
Censo de la Población y las Viviendas de España 1960
Censo de la Población de España 1970
Instituto Nacional de Estadística Censo de Población y Viviendas 1980, 1991, 2001
Prados de la Escosura, Leandro (2003) El Progreso Económico de España 1850-2000
Banco de España (2004) Cuentas Financieras de la Economía Española 1990-2005
Banco de España (2004), Boletín Económico 11 Encuesta Financiera de las Familias:
Descripción, Métodos y Resultados Preliminares
Banco de España Indicadores del Mercado de la Vivienda
http://www.bde.es/infoest/sindi.htm
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Dirección General Estadísticas Catastrales 1990-2003
de Catastro http://www.catastro.minhac.es/esp/estadisticas1.asp
Caixa de Catalunya (2004), Informe sobre el Consumo Report Monográfico: El Crecimiento del Stock de Riqueza
y la Economía Familiar, Junio de las Familias Españolas y su Impacto sobre el
Consumo en el Período 1995-2003: Una Versión Territorial
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (1976) Datos Básicos para la Historia Financiera de España 1850-1975
C. Other
Comín, Francisco (1985), Monografía n.40, Fuentes Cuantitativas para el Estudio del Sector Público 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales en España 1801-1980
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Panel IRPF-AEAT 1982-1998 1982-1998
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Muestra de Declarantes de IRPF 2002 2002
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Base de Datos del Sector Público Español
Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, Dirección General de Memoria de las  Actuaciones de la Inspección de los Tributos 1987
Inspección Financiera y Tributaria durante 1987
Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda, Dirección General de Memoria de las  Actuaciones de la Inspección de los Tributos 1988
Inspección Financiera y Tributaria
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Secretaria de Estado Resultados de la Inspección de los Tributos 1989
de Hacienda
Dirección General de Inpección Financiera y Tributaria Memoria de la Dirección General de Inpección Financiera 1990, 1991
y Tributaria
Agencia Tributaria, Departamento de Inspección FinancieraMemoria de Actividades 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997
y Tributaria 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Comisión para Evaluar el Fraude por el Impuesto
sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas
Ministerio de Hacienda Informe sobre Gestión Tributaria 1979-1981
Boletín Oficial del Estado
Gaceta de Madrid
Global Find Data http://www.globalfinddata.com
Table I. Data Sources
